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In  the  past  decade  and  a  half  U.S.  monetary  policy  has  deviated  radically  from  that  of  the  postwar 
period  as  it  embarked  on  a  series  of  policy  experiments  generally  designed  to  fight  perceived 
inflationary  pressures.  While  it  is true  that  monetary  policy  since  the  Treasury-Fed  Accord  of  195 1 has 
periodically  tightened  to  fight  inflation,  policy  became  much  more  interventionist  and  aggressive  with 
the  appointment  of  Paul  Volckcr  and,  later,  Alan  Greenspan,  as  successive  chairmen  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board.  In  addition,  monetary  policy  has  gradually  abandoned  other  goals  as  it  has  come  to 
focus  almost  exclusively  on  price  stability  (and,  perhaps  at  times.  on  the  foreign  exchange  value  of  the 
dollar).  Beginning  in  1979  the  Federal  Reserve  under  Chairman  Volcker  pushed  interest  rates  above  20 
percent  (the  prime  rate  averaged  20.3  percent  in the  third  quarter  of  1981)  and  unemployment  rates 
above  10 percent  in  its pursuit  of  money  targets  and  stable  prices,  resulting  in the  deepest  recession 
since  the  Great  Depression.  Similarly,  under  Alan  Greenspan  the  Federal  Reserve  pushed  interest  rates 
to  nearly  I 1 percent  in  the  first  quarter  of  1989  (when  inflation  was  less  than  5 percent),  contributing 
to  a  long  recession  from  which  the  economy  is still  recovering,  and  more  recently  the  Fed  has 
tightened  five  times  to  fight  perceived  inflationary  pressures. 
In  our  view,  it  is not  a coincidence  that  the  tenure  of  chairmen  Volcker  and  Greenspan  overlaps,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  period  that  S Jay  and  David  A.  Levy  (1991)  call  the  “contained  depression”  and  that 
Wallace  Peterson  (1994)  calls  the  “silent  depression.”  While  we  do  not  attribute  this  prolonged  period 
of  subpar  economic  performance  solely  to  misguided  monetary  policy,  we  do  believe  that  the  nearly 
single-minded  pursuit  of  stable  prices  by  the  Federal  Reserve  since  1979  has  contributed  to  the  high 
levels  of  unemployment,  low  productivity  growth,  and  reduced  economic  growth  experienced  by  the 
U.S.  economy  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  (when  compared  with  the  performance  enjoyed  between 
World  War  II  and  the  early  1970s). 
During  the  past  15 years  the  Federal  Reserve  has  experimented  with,  or  seriously  considered  the  use 
of,  a  wide  variety  of  targets  including  reserve  aggregates  (both  borrowed  and  nonborrowed  reserves), 
monetary  aggregates  (various  measures  of  M 1, M2,  and  even  M3).  P-star,  price  indexes,  gold  prices, 
real  (a  ante)  “equilibrium”  interest  rates,  and  expected  inflation.  Each  of  these  targets  has  been 
claimed  by  one  or  more  members  of  the  Board  of  Governors  to  be  linked  to  inflation  (or  future 
inflation),  often  with  little  theoretical  or  empirical  justification.  Even  if  one  were  to  accept  that  the 
Federal  Reserve’s  sole  goal  should  be  to  stabilize  prices,  there  simply  is nothing  approaching  a 
consensus  among  economists  that  any  of  these  targets  is reliably  linked  to  changes  of  price  levels.  As 
1 one  target  was  shown  to  be  a  poor  predictor  of  inflation,  the  Federal  Reserve  adopted  yet  another 
target.  It  has  become  increasingly  apparent  that  Fed  policy  is rudderless. 
When  monetarist  theory  formed  the  basis  of  policy,  frequent  intervention  by  the  Federal  Reserve  to 
maintain  money  growth  close  to  targets  had  a theoretical  justification  accepted  by  at  least  part  of  the 
economics  profession;  Federal  Reserve  policy  in the  1980s  was  at  least  coherent.  However,  the 
experience  of  the  1980s  has  discredited  monetarism  and  the  use  of  monetary  targets.  There  is  no 
longer  any  theoretical  justification  for  frequent,  active  intervention  by  the  Federal  Reserve  into 
financial  markets  because  there  is no  consensus  regarding  a  single  target  variable  to  be  used  in  policy 
formulation  to  achieve  the  goals  of  monetary  policy.  We  believe  that  given  the  current  degree  of 
uncertainty  among  economists  regarding  the  links  among  macroeconomic  variables,  it  is not  possible 
for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  follow  a  rule  that  would  target  a variable  in  order  to  generate  price  stability. 
Statements  by  various  Federal  Reserve  officials  seem  to  reflect  a  growing  sense  of  uncertainty 
regarding  guides  to  be  used  in policy  formation.  In  candid  remarks  some  Federal  Reserve  officials 
have  admitted  that  they  rely  on  hunches,  intuition,  and  anecdotal  evidence  when  deciding  whether  to 
change  the  policy  stance.  Our  purpose  in this  Public  Policy  Brief  is not  to  criticize  the  Federal  Reserve 
for  the  apparent  inability  to  settle  on  a  single  target.  Formulating  monetary  policy  has  always  been 
something  of  an  art,  and  given  the  level  of  development  of  monetary  theory.  it must  remain  so.  The 
radical  deviation  from  traditional  monetary  policy  that  began  in  1979  with  the  announcement  of 
monetary  targets  appeared  to  offer  an  alternative  to  the  art  of  policy  formulation;  the  Federal  Reserve 
could  simply  announce  that  the  money  supply  would  grow  at  a  constant  rate  and  then  hit  its  targets. 
This  was  a  mistake.  However,  as  we  return  to  the  traditional  methods  of  policy  formulation.  the 
Federal  Reserve  must  use  its  artful,  discretionary  intervention  more  sparingly  and  more  carefully; 
radical  policy  shifts  should  be  undertaken  only  in exceptional  circumstances. 
Low  inflation  is a  worthwhile  goal.  but  the  Federal  Reserve  must  recognize  that  economists  have  not 
reached  agreement  regarding  the  causes,  or  the  costs  of  inflation;  they  have  not  reached  a  consensus 
that  the  costs  of  fighting  inflation  are  substantially  less  than  the  benefits  of  stable  prices.  As  such, 
single-minded  pursuit  of  stable  prices  is neither  justifiable  nor  desirable,  nor  has  any  coherent  theory 
regarding  the  method  by  which  the  Federal  Reserve  could  stabilize  prices  yet  emerged.  The  Federal 
Reserve  must  also  recognize  that  economists  are  uncertain  how  to  achieve  stable  prices  and  are  divided 
over  whether  stable  prices  are  worth  the  costs.  When  a  varietv  of  economic  data  give  conflicting 
signals  regarding  inflationary  nressure,  when  the  sources  of  inflationarv  nressure  are  not  certain,  when 
2 the  Federal  Reserve  is relying  on  hypotheses  and  intuition  (as  members  of  the  Federal  Open  Market 
Committee  themselves  have  indicated)  to  predict  future  inflation,  and  when  practically  all  current  data 
indicate  the  absence  of  inflationary  pressures,  it  is not  appropriate  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  make  a 
maior  policy  shift. 
In  1996  the  nation  will  mark  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  Employment  Act  of  1946,  which  set 
“maximum  employment,  production,  and  purchasing  power”  as the  “policy  and  responsibility”  of  the 
federal  government.  It  has  been  17 years  since  that  law  was  strengthened  with  the  passage  of  the  Full 
Employment  and  Balanced  Growth  Act  of  1978.  which  specified  the  goal  of  a  3 percent 
unemployment  rate  to  be  achieved  for  workers  over  the  age  of  20  years  by  1983.  But  that  goal  was 
not  achieved  in  any  year  since  1978.  In  fact,  the  unemployment  rate  since  1978  for  workers  over  20 
has  averaged  more  than  6 percent,  or  twice  the  target.  In  contrast,  the  3 percent  goal  was  bettered  four 
times  during  the  1960s.  and  the  unemployment  rate  for  adult  males  averaged  less  than  3.8  percent  for 
the  entire  period  from  World  War  II  to  1978.  After  1978  adult  males  had  an  unemployment  rate  above 
3.8  percent  in  every  year  save  two.  While  many  factors  have  contributed  to  the  much  higher 
unemployment  rates  since  1978,  we  believe  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  pursuit  of  stable  prices  has 
played  a  continuing  and  significant  role.  It  is time  to  direct  monetary  policy  away  from  the  pursuit  of 
a  single  goal  to  include  the  congressionally  mandated  goal  of  “maximum  employment.”  As  of  June 
1994,  8 million  Americans  were  officially  unemployed,  another  4  million  were  involuntarily  working 
part-time,  and  millions  more  were  out  of  the  job  market  because  they  did  not  believe  they  would  be 
able  to  find  jobs.  Monetary  and  fiscal  policies  are  failing  to  live  up  to  the  promises  of  the 
congressional  mandates. 
As  we  will  discuss,  some  people  within  and  outside  the  Federal  Reserve  have  pushed  for  tighter 
monetary  policy  to  fight  what  they  believe  are  inflationary  pressures.  In  addition.  others  have  pushed 
for  policy  that  would  raise  short-term  interest  rates  in the  belief  that  this  would  lower  inflation 
expectations  and.  thus,  long-term  interest  rates.  More  recently,  instability  in  foreign  exchange  markets 
and  depreciation  of  the  dollar  against  the  yen  and  mark  have  led  some  to  call  for  tighter  monetary 
policy  to  “protect”  the  dollar.  While  we  agree  that  under  some  conditions  it might  be  necessary  to 
adopt  tight  policy  to  fight  inflation,  to  lower  long-term  interest  rates,  or  to  strengthen  the  currency,  we 
believe  that  current  conditions  do  not  warrant  tight  policy.  Indeed,  we  believe  that  the  tighter  policy 
stance  taken  by  the  Federal  Reserve  between  February  and  August  1994  (in  which  the  federal  funds 
rate  was  raised  five  times)  was  a  mistake.  Unless  unemployment  rates  fall  precipitously  and  capacity 
utilization  rates  rise  quickly,  we  can  see  no justification  for  hnthcr  interest  rate  increases. 
3 The  experience  with  a  variety  of  targets  (including  reserve  and  monetary  aggregates  and  the  recent 
shift  to  real  interest  rates  and  inflation  expectations)  has  cast  doubt  on  the  likelihood  that  a  single 
variable  will  be  shown  to  be  closely  and  reliably  linked  to  future  inflation;  it  is even  less  likely  that 
such  a  variable,  should  it be  found,  could  be  controlled  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  In  short,  we  see  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  Federal  Reserve  will  discover  a  target  variable  whose  control  will  lead  to 
stable  prices.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  Federal  Reserve  knows  (or  will  soon  know)  how  to  achieve 
stable  prices.  We  do  not  believe  that  economists  have  sufficient  knowledge  to  calculate  the  costs  of 
achieving  stable  prices  in terms  of  unemployment  and  lost  output.  Given  these  uncertainties  and  the 
inherent  vagaries  of  economic  projections,  we  believe  it  is best  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  take  a  less 
active  role  in  the  economy.  In particular,  we  do  not  believe  that  conditions  over  the  past  six  months 
have  warranted  the  Federal  Reserve’s  action  to  increase  short-term  interest  rates  by  175  basis  points. 
This  has  unnecessarily  endangered  the  recovery,  kept  long-term  interest  rates  high,  led  to  instability  in 
stock,  bond,  and  foreign  exchange  markets,  increased  the  government  deficit,  and  burdened 
homeowners  with  higher  mortgage  payments. 
Volcker’s  Federal  Reserve:  The Experiment  in Practical  Monetarism 
A  radical  shift  in  monetary  policy  began  in  1979  when  Federal  Reserve  Board  Chairman  Paul  Volcker 
announced  that  the  Federal  Reserve  would  no  longer  target  interest  rates,  but  would  instead  target 
monetary  aggregates  (with  particular  attention  paid  to  M 1, the  narrowest  definition  of  money)  in  an 
attempt  to  implement  “practical  monetarism”  (Fazzari  and  Minsky  1984,  M.  Friedman  1984,  &eider 
1989).  Such  targets  are  consistent  with  monetarist  theory,  which  claims  that  money  aggregates  are 
closely  related  to  nominal  income  and  GNP  in the  short  run  and  to  the  rate  of  inflation  in the  long  run. 
By  pursuing  tight  money  (monetarist)  policy  and  hitting  money  supply  targets.  the  Federal  Reserve 
would  have  purported  control  over  the  rate  of  inflation,  and  according  to  monetarists,  would  induce 
only  minimal  and  temporary  negative  impacts  on  real  output  and  employment.  In  practice,  this  meant 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  would  target  low  rates  of  growth  of  bank  reserves,  which  through  the  deposit 
multiplier  would  translate  into  low  rates  of  growth  of  monetary  aggregates.  In turn,  this  would 
generate  low  rates  of  inflation  without  entailing  dramatic  decline  of  production  and  employment. 
Academic  studies  had  claimed  to  show  that  the  Federal  Reserve  would  be  able  to  regulate  the  rate  of 
growth  of  monetary  aggregates  tightly  enough  to  hit  targets;  this  would  then  allow  it  to  eliminate 
inflation  (Balbach  198 1, Brunner  1968). 
By  the  late  1980s  perhaps  no  economic  theory  had  been  more  thoroughly  discredited  than  this  simple 
4 monetarist  theory  of  the  relation  between  monetary  aggregates  and  the  rate  of  inflation  (B.  Friedman 
1988).  The  Federal  Reserve’s  experiment  brought  record  interest  rates.  These  rates  contributed  to 
unemployment  rates  not  seen  since  the  1930s  and  negative  rates  of  real  GNP  growth  --  the  worst 
recession  since  the  Great  Depression.  Moreover,  a  long  list  of  other  maladies  can  be  traced  at  least  in 
part  to  the  great  monetarist  experiment  (the  Savings  &  Loan  fiasco,  a  burgeoning  trade  deficit,  record 
government  budget  deficits.  and  rising  debt  ratios  of  domestic  firms  and  foreign  countries). 
The  severity  of  the  recession  forced  the  Volcker-led  Federal  Reserve  to  ease  monetary  policy  and  to 
abandon  M 1 targets  (Fazzari  and  Minsky  1984).  The  empirical  correlation  between  M 1 and  inflation 
(and  nominal  income)  fell  apart,  forcing  reevaluation  of  monetarist  doctrine.  as  can  be  seen  in Figure 
1. Some  researchers  found  that  the  correlation  between  M2  and  inflation  survived  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  experiment,  encouraging  it to  adopt  M2  as  its  new  target  in  1983,  although  intermediate 
targets  for  Ml  were  still  reported.  Finally,  Ml  was  dropped  altogether  as  a  target  in  1986  as  its  rate  of 
growth  exploded  beyond  the  established  targets,  even  as  disinflation  allowed  price  increases  to  reach 
the  lowest  levels  in  nearly  a generation. 
Insert Figure  1 
Note:  Figure  represents  the  quarterly  rate  of  growth  of  the  consumer  price  index,  M 1 money  supply, 
and  M2  money  supply. 
The  most  surprising  thing  about  the  monetarist  experiment,  however.  was  the  eventual  breakdown  of 
any  observable  relationship  between  any  monetary  aggregate  and  either  the  rate  of  inflation  or  the  rate 
of  nominal  GNP  growth.  Indeed,  during  the  1980s  the  rate  of  inflation  was  negatively  correlated  with 
the  rate  of  M 1 growth  and  essentially  uncorrelated  with  the  rate  of  M2  growth  as  shown  in Figure  1. 
Furthermore.  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply  exploded  even  as  the  rate  of  inflation  fell, 
precisely  when  the  Federal  Reserve  targeted  money  aggregates  and  tried  to  hit  lower  targets.  By  1988 
doubts  about  the  usefulness  of  monetary  targets  were  raised  by  both  economists  associated  with 
Keynesian  theory  (B.  Friedman  1988)  as  well  as by  those  associated  with  monetarism  (Thornton 
1988),  and  questions  were  raised  about  the  Federal  Reserve’s  ability  to  hit  money  targets  and  about  the 
relationship  between  monetary  aggregates  and  inflation.  Previous  studies  that  had  purportedly 
demonstrated  these  propositions  were  now  thought  to  have  merely  reported  spurious  correlations. 
Insert  Figure  B 
Greenspan’s  Federal  Reserve: Moving  Targets and Soft  Landings 
5 Chairman  Volcker’s  successor,  Alan  Greenspan,  did  not  significantly  change  Volcker’s  policy,  nor  did 
the  Federal  Reserve  fare  any  better  in  hitting  monetary  aggregate  targets.  By  the  late  1980s  some 
monetarist  economists  (Thornton  1988)  began  to  call  for  inflation  targets  rather  than  money  targets 
because,  for  unknown  reasons,  monetary  aggregates  were  no  longer  closely  associated  with  either 
inflation  or  nominal  GNP  growth.  While  the  Federal  Reserve  under  Chairman  Greenspan  did  not 
change  announced  targets,  it did  tighten  monetary  policy  in  1987,  in  late  1988,  and  in  early  1989  on 
the  expectation  that  inflation  would  again  increase  because  of  the  extent  of  what  was  recognized  as  the 
“longest  lasting  peacetime  expansion  of  U.S.  history”  during  the  last  half  of  the  1980s. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  immediately  upon  the  appointment  of  Alan  Greenspan  as  chairman  in 
1987,  the  Federal  Reserve  moved  toward  tight  policy  with  repercussions  in  financial  markets  that  were 
similar  to  those  experienced  so  far  in  1994  (as  will  be  discussed  below).  Between  March  1986  and 
February  1987  total  bank  reserves  had  been  growing  at  an  average  rate  of  nearly  2.5  percent  per 
month.  The  Federal  Reserve  moved  toward  very  tight  policy,  causing  reserves  to  fall  by  nearly  6 
percent  in February  and  by  a total  of  2.54  percent  over  the  next  10 months  (so  that  average  reserve 
growth  from  February  to  December  1987  was  -0.23  percent  per  month).  The  interest  rate  on  long-term 
government  bonds  rose  from  7.64  percent  in the  first  quarter  of  1987  to  9.08  percent  in the  third 
quarter.  Capital  losses  in  bond  markets  led  to  a  run  to  the  short  end  of  the  market;  the  run  spread  to 
the  stock  market,  contributing  in the  crash  of  October  1987.  The  Federal  Reserve  was  forced  to  ease 
policy  temporarily  to  stop  the  expanding  financial  crisis.  As  Giordano  (1987)  reported,  the  Federal 
Reserve  pumped  more  liquidity  into  financial  markets  than  it  had  during  any  previous  financial  crisis. 
Once  the  immediate  crisis  abated,  the  Federal  Reserve  returned  to  tight  policy.  As  we  will  argue 
below,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  tightening  in early  1994  had  a similar  (although  smaller)  effect  on 
financial  markets. 
Between  mid-1988  and  mid-1989  the  Greenspan-led  Fed  raised  the  discount  rate  I 1 times  in  I 1 
months  and  held  it at  7 percent  through  1990  (Church  1994).  The  announced  goal  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  was  to  achieve  a  “soft  landing”  through  tight  policy  in  order  to  prevent  inflation  from 
developing  --  even  though  actual  inflation  was  not  accelerating  and  even  though  the  primary  indicator 
used  by  monetarists  of  forthcoming  inflation,  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply,  did  not  foretell 
rising  inflation  rates.  The  rates  of  growth  of  Ml,  M2,  and  M3  were  equal  to  (or  below)  the  rate  of 
inflation  from  1988  through  1990,  which  should  have  indicated  to  a  monetarist  that  policy  was  already 
disinflationary,  if  not  deflationary.  Indeed.  a  deep  and  prolonged  recession  was  the  result. 
6 In  1993,  for  the  sixth  straight  year,  the  rate  of  growth  of  M2  failed  to  reach  the  midpoint  of  the  target 
range.  Indeed.  the  rate  of  growth  of  M2  did  not  even  reach  the  floor  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  target 
range  in  1992  and  1993.  even  though  the  Federal  Reserve  continually  revised  its targets  downward. 
Close  examination  of  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC)  policy  directives  of  1992  shows  a 
split  in the  interpretation  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  inability  to  hit  its targets  (Ritter  1993).  The 
fundamentalist  monetarist  members  of  the  FOMC  advocated  monetary  ease  to  raise  the  rate  of  growth 
of  M2  to  the  level  they  believed  consistent  with  adequate  growth  of  real  GNP  (Ritter  1993).  These 
members  interpreted  money  growth  rates  as  indicating  excessive  monetary  tightness.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  practical  monetarists  urged  tighter  directives  because  they  believed  the  low  interest  rates  and 
steady,  positive  inflation  rates  revealed  excessive  monetary  ease  (Angel1  1994,  Meltzer  1994,  Murray 
1991,  Zuckerman  1993).  The  latter  view  is apparently  still  shared  by  the  majority  of  the  presidents  of 
the  district  Federal  Reserve  banks,  most  of  whom  are  “inflation  hawks”  (Ritter  1993,  Zuckerman 
1993)‘.  Furthermore,  the  rates  of  growth  of  MI  and  of  bank  reserves  have  once  again  exploded  -- 
which  a  monetarist  could  take  as  evidence  of  future  inflation. 
Chairman  Greenspan’s  policy  statements  are  consistent  with  the  practical  monetarists’  view.  In  spite  of 
the  lack  of  evidence  of  the  existence  of  inflationary  pressures,  as  discussed  below.  these  nonexistent 
pressures  are  continually  cited  as justification  for  restraint  and,  indeed.  for  concern.  As  a  result,  the 
Federal  Reserve  had  not  lowered  the  discount  rate  since  the  third  quarter  of  1992,  in  spite  of  the 
sluggish  recovery;  on  the  contrary,  from  February  to  August  1994,  it  had  raised  the  federal  funds  rate 
five  times.  Chairman  Greenspan  even  took  the  unusual  step  of  calling  press  conferences  to  announce 
rate  increases,  perhaps  to  forestall  the  movement  in Congress  for  open  FOMC  meetings  and  for 
making  the  minutes  public,  but  perhaps  also  to just@  his  controversial  policy  of  tightening.  Recently, 
the  chairman  claimed  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
job  is not  yet  complete  .  .  . judging  from  the  remaining  inflation  premium  embodied  in  long- 
term  rates.  [A]  persistent  inflation  [has]  devastating  effects  on  our  economy  and  society. 
[Having]  paid  so  large  a price  in  reversing  inflation  processes  to  date,  it  is crucial  that  we  do 
not  allow  them  to  re-emerge.  [There]  has  emerged  a  growing  consensus  throughout  the  world 
that  a  monetary  policy  geared  towards  the  pursuit  of  price  stability  over  time  is the  central 
bank’s  most  significant  contribution  to  achieving  maximal  growth  of  a  nation’s  well  being.” 
(Greenspan.  1994b,  pp.  5,  12) 
Owing  to  the  unsatisfactory  experience  with  monetary  aggregate  targets.  some  have  turned  to  price 
7 targets  as  a  substitute.  W.  Lee  Hoskins,  former  president  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Minneapolis, 
has  recently  claimed  that  there  is near-universal  support  for  the  proposition  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
can  control  the  price  level  but  cannot  control  the  rate  of  growth  of  GNP  (Hoskins  199 1). Jerry  Jordan, 
president  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland,  has  proposed  a  consumer  price  index  (CPI)  target. 
If,  for  example,  average  consumer  prices  for  1982-I 984  are  set  equal  to  an  index  of  100,  then  the 
target  should  be  155  for  the  year  2000  (the  index  currently  would  be  about  145);  after  that  date  the 
Federal  Reserve  should  maintain  price  stability  (defined  as  maintaining  the  index  within  plus  or  minus 
three  points  from  155)  forever  (Jordan  1993).  Each  year  the  Federal  Reserve  would  announce  short- 
term  targets  consistent  with  attaining  the  long-term  target  (that  is, the  index  set  at  155).  According  to 
Jordan,  this  would  eliminate  inflation  expectations  and  would  generate  the  expectation  that  the 
purchasing  power  of  the  dollar  would  be  fixed  by  2000. 
Others  have  called  for  a gold  price  target,  and  even  Chairman  Greenspan  has  given  some  support  to 
this.  According  to  former  Board  of  Governors  (BOG)  member  Wayne  Angell,  since  monetary 
aggregates  such  as  M2  have  become  unreliable  as predictors  of  forthcoming  inflation, 
monitoring  commodity  prices  is probably  a better  way  to  go.  They  --  particularly  the  price  of 
gold  --  are  a  signal  that  a  lower  value  of  money  is driving  the  acquisition  rate  for  all  assets. 
[W]e  do  best.  and  grow  the  most,  when  .  .  . the  permanent  goal  is zero  inflation.  [A]t  this  point 
in  our  financial  history  the  price-level  prediction  in the  price  of  gold  provides  the  best  single 
indicator  for  monetary  neutrality  in the  reserve  currency  country  of  the  world.  [T]he  price  of 
gold  needs  to  be  brought  down.”  (Angel1  1994) 
Chairman  Greenspan  noted  in  1993  that  “the  price  of  gold,  which  can  be  broadly  reflective  of 
inflationary  expectations,  has  risen  sharply  in  recent  months,”  using  this  as  part  of  the  justification  for 
the  May  1993  shiR  toward  an  asymmetric  directive,  biased  in the  direction  of  tighter  policy 
(Greenspan  1993,  p.  5).  Chairman  Greenspan  argued  again  in  1994  that  the  price  of  gold  “has  been 
especially  sensitive  to  inflation  concerns,”  citing  rising  gold  prices  as  an  indication  of  inflation 
expectations  (Greenspan.  I994a,  p.  14). The  chairman’s  announcements  notwithstanding,  however, 
BOG  member  Lawrence  Lindsey  rejected  the  use  of  gold  prices,  stating,  “If  that’s  what  the  Chairman 
believes,  that’s  fine;  it’s  not  my  view  that  gold  forms  a key  or  central  variable”  (Bradsher  1994). 
It cannot  be  overemphasized  how  radical  a  proposal  this  is.  While  the  gold  standard  was  long  used  to 
stabilize  exchange  rates  among  countries,  to  our  knowledge,  no  country  has  cve~  tried  to  stabilize 
domestic  commodity  prices  in terms  of  gold,  nor  has  any  country  tried  to  stabilize  the  domestic  price 
of  gold  without  adopting  fixed  exchange  rates  and  an  international  gold  standard.  Furthermore,  there  is 
8 no  reason  to  believe  that  bringing  down  the  price  of  gold  would  have  any  predictable  effect  on  the  rate 
of  growth  of  domestic  price  levels.  Finally,  the  theoretical  justification  for  the  gold  standard  has 
usually  relied  on  the  presumption  that  central  bank  domestic  policy  would  be  passive  and  that 
domestic  prices  would  be  flexible. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Chairman’s  Policy  Statement  of  July  1993 
In  his  testimony  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Economic  Growth  and  Credit  Formation  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance  and  Urban  Affairs  on  July  20,  1993,  the  chairman  announced  an 
abrupt  change  of  “guides”  to  be  used  for  Federal  Reserve  policy.  While  the  Federal  Reserve  would 
continue  to  report  targets  for  monetary  aggregates  --  as  required  by  the  Humphrey-Hawkins  Act  of 
1978  --  these  would  not  actually  be  used  as  guides  for  policy  formulation.  Instead.  the  Federal  Reserve 
would  use  real  interest  rates  as the  guides,  particularly  for  longer-term  policy.  It  was  emphasized, 
however,  that  this  shift  in targets  did  not  represent  a  shift  in Federal  Reserve  goals:  “to  foster 
maximum  sustainable  economic  growth  and  rising  standards  of  living.  And  in that endeavor,  the most 
productive  function  the central  bank can perform  is to achieve and maintain price  stability” 
(Greenspan  1993,  p.  10; emphasis  added).  Thus.  real  interest  rates  would  be  targeted  in  order  to 
implement  a  policy  whose  goal  was  to  eliminate  inflation. 
The  chairman  explained  that  this  shift  away  from  monetary  aggregate  targets  was  necessary  because 
“the  historical  relationships  between  money  and  income,  and  between  money  and  the  price  level,  have 
largely  broken  down,  depriving  the  aggregates  of  much  of  their  usefulness  as  guides  to  policy”  (p.  9). 
He  also  noted  that  even  the  P-star  model  that  was  based  on  a  long-term  relationship  between  M2  and 
prices  no  longer  served  as  a  useful  guide  to  policy.  He  argued  that  “if  the  historical  relationships 
between  M2  and  nominal  income  had  remained  intact,  the  behavior  of  M2  in  recent  years  would  have 
been  consistent  with  an  economy  in  severe  contraction”  (p.  8). 
However,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  of  Governors  and  the  Federal  Reserve  district  bank  presidents 
predicted  continued  “moderate”  growth,  with  real  GDP  growing  at  a  rate  of  2.5  percent  in  1993  and 
between  2.5  to  3.25  percent  for  1994.  Indeed,  rather  than  predicting  a sluggish  economy,  as 
traditionally  would  be  indicated  by  growth  of  M2,  the  Federal  Reserve  was  concerned  that  inflation 
was  not  declining  and  might  be  on  the  verge  of  accelerating.  Thus,  monetary  policy  would  have  to  be 
“alert  to  the  possibility  that  an  ill-timed  easing”  might  raise  inflation  expectations,  pushing  interest 
rates  higher  and  reducing  economic  growth  (p.  4).  While  M2  performance  would  appear  to  prescribe 
9 further  easing  of  monetary  policy,  the  Federal  Reserve  had  not  moved  to  ease  policy  since  September 
1992  because  “the  stance  of  policy  has  appeared  broadly  appropriate  to  the  evolving  economic 
circumstances”  (p.  4).  Hence,  monetary  aggregates  were  no  longer  a  useful  guide  to  policy  because 
they  seemed  to  indicate  a  resumption  of  recession,  while  the  Federal  Reserve  feared  that  there  was 
greater  danger  of  accelerating  inflation  or,  at  least,  of  expectations  of  accelerating  inflation.  The 
Federal  Reserve,  thus,  desired  to  use  a guide  that  more  closely  reflected  its  view  that  these  dangers 
were  present.  According  to  Chairman  Greenspan’s  testimony,  the  correct  real  interest  rate  to  be  used  as 
a  guide  would  be  that  which  “if  maintained,  would  keep  the  economy  at  its production  potential  over 
time”  (p.  10).  This  was  denoted  as  the  “equilibrium  real  rate  --  or,  more  appropriately,  the  equilibrium 
term  structure  of  real  rates”  (p.  10). This  appears  to  be  an  adaptation  of  the  “natural  rate”  approach  to 
interest  rates.  If  the  current  real  interest  rate  exceeds  the  natural  rate  (Chairman  Greenspan’s 
equilibrium  rate),  this  will  disinflate  the  economy;  he  associated  real  rates  “below  that  level  with 
eventual  resource  bottlenecks  and  rising  inflation,  which  ultimately  engenders  economic  contraction” 
(p.  10).  The  appropriate  equilibrium  real  rate  depends  on  “the  ebb  and  flow  of  underlying  forces,”  that 
is,  on  those  forces  that  affect  spending  decisions  (p,  10).  According  to  the  chairman’s  testimony,  it  is 
the  long-term  real  rate  that  is important  for  decision  making,  but  the  Federal  Reserve  directly  affects 
only  the  short-term  real  rate  (the  Federal  Reserve  affects  long-term  real  rates  only  through  impacts  on 
inflation  expectations);  however,  if the  short-term  real  rate  is substantially  below  the  long-term  real 
rate,  this  must  indicate  the  market  expects  the  short-term  rate  will  rise  to  prevent  inflation. 
It  was  readily  acknowledged  by  the  chaimran  that  one  cannot  estimate  the  equilibrium  real  rate  “with  a 
great  deal  of  confidence,”  but  one  could  be  sure  that  estimates  can  be  accurate  “enough  to  be  useful 
for  monetary  policy”  (p.  10). Furthermore,  he  admitted  that  real  rates  are  not  observable;  but,  again,  he 
asserted  that  they  can  be  estimated  with  sufficient  accuracy  using  data  on  nominal  rates  and  estimates 
of  expected  inflation.  Using  such  information,  Chairman  Greenspan  concluded  that  real  short-term 
rates  were  at  that  time  nearly  zero,  while  real  long-term  rates  were  substantially  higher.  This  indicated 
to  the  chairman  that  “short-term  real  rates  will  have  to  rise”  in  order  to  avoid  “substantial  inflationary 
imbalances”  (p.  IO). This  was  to  signal  that  the  Federal  Reserve  had  already  eased  policy  as  much  as  it 
believed  prudent  and  that  its  future  policy  would  be  biased  toward  monetary  restraint,  which,  in turn, 
would  raise  the  real  rates  to  the  equilibrium  rates  thought  to  be  consistent  with  price  stability. 
Again,  the  Fed  appears  to  have  adopted  a  tight  policy  because  of  concern  with  inflation  and  inflation 
expectations.  According  to  Chairman  Greenspan,  “the  news  on  inflation  this  year  [1993]  must  be 
characterized  as  disappointing”  (p.  6)  and  even  “disturbing”  (p.  4);  he  claimed  that  inflation 
10 expectations  had  risen  during  the  first  half  of  1993  and  feared  that  unless  inflation  expectations  and 
price  pressures  were  contained,  these  would  raise  long-term  interest  rates  and  stall  economic 
expansion.  Furthermore,  he  claimed  that  increased  inflation  is correlated  with  reduced  growth  of 
productivity  --  a  finding  he  attributed  to  the  propensity  of  economic  agents  to  mistake  nominal  price 
changes  for  real  (relative)  changes.  Finally,  he  argued  that  inflation  raises  the  effective  taxation  of 
investment  and  saving.  leading  to  reduced  capital  formation,  and  that  if,  as  the  Federal  Reserve 
contends,  monetary  policy  can  induce  price  stability,  then  it will  lead  to  lower  long-term  interest  rates 
and  will  foster  capital  accumulation  and  productivity  growth. 
The  announcement  of  new  targets  for  monetary  policy  was  met  with  surprise.  Economists  from  a 
broad  cross-section  of  theoretical  approaches  rejected  the  new  policy  as  unworkable  and  inadequately 
grounded  in  economic  theory.  Paul  Samuelson  (1993)  argued  that  in a  recession  there  is nothing  wrong 
with  negative  real  interest  rates  and  there  is no  reason  why  there  should  be  a  positive  real  return  on 
highly  liquid  transactions  accounts  in any  case.  According  to  Samuelson.  the  Federal  Reserve’s  new 
choice  of  targets  was  actually  undertaken  because  the  previous  target  (M2)  could  not  be  used  to justify 
its  desire  to  tighten  the  screws  to  fight  inflation.  Henry  Kaufman  (1993)  argued  that  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  asymmetric  directive  (of  May  1993)  was  premature.  that  there  was  no  evidence  of 
accelerating  inflation.  and  that  the  world  needed  a  coordinated  effort  to  bring  worldwide  interest  rates 
down.  Importantly,  Kaufman  wrote:  “What  I do  not  favor  is a  preemptive  move  toward  restraint  on  the 
pretext  that  this  would  somehow  shore  up  the  Federal  Reserve’s  ‘credibility’  in the  financial  markets 
and,  in  so  doing,  relax  market  concerns  about  inflation  prospects”;  indeed.  this  would  be  “a policy 
argument  that  has  an  unfortunate  tone  of  self-righteousness.  rather  than  a  firm  analytical  grounding.  As 
a policy  position,  it  is especially  bizarre  at  the  present  time  when,  if anything.  the  financial  markets 
have  shown  themselves  to  be  quite  comfortable  with  the  overall  stance  of  monetary  policy”  (p.  18). 
Yet,  we  note  the  Federal  Reserve  embarked  on  exactly  such  a  “bizarre”  policy  three  months  later.  Neal 
Soss  (1993)  rejected  real  interest  rate  targets  because  of  “operational  questions”  and  “analytical 
ambiguities.”  According  to  Sass,  “real  interest  rates  can  be judgmentally  inferred,  but  never  objectively 
observed  .  .  . at  best,  the  Federal  Reserve  can  capture  only  a glimmer  of  real  rates  through  the  gossamer 
of  the  real  and  money  economy’s  performance.  How,  then,  can  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  expect  to 
use  such  an  intangible  and  unobservable  concept  as  a practical  target  for  its  open  market  operations?” 
(p.  28).  Robert  Brusca  (1993)  also  rejected  Chairman  Greenspan’s  “disappointment”  over  inflation 
figures:  “The  Fed  has  no  basis  for  being  despondent  about  inflation’s  normal  to  excellent  cyclical 
showing”  (p.  30).  In  a  letter  to  President  Clinton.  House  Banking  Committee  Chairman  Henry 
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hardships  for  millions”  (p.  3 1). 
It  should  be  noted  that  even  the  Federal  Reserve  agreed  that  economic  performance  in  1993,  and  that 
projected  for  1994,  did  not  signal  dangers  of  an  overheated  economy.  The  Federal  Reserve’s  own 
projections  for  1993  were  real  GNP  growth  of  2.5  percent  and  2.5  to  3.25  percent  for  1994.  Given 
excess  capacity  and  rapid  growth  of  new  capacity  (which  the  Federal  Reserve  estimated  at  more  than 
2.25  percent  for  1993),  as  well  as  high  unemployment  levels  (more  than  8 million  unemployed,  plus  4 
million  involuntarily  employed  part-time,  plus  millions  more  outside  the  labor  force),  this  rate  of 
economic  growth  would  not  have  indicated  danger  of  accelerating  inflation.  Instead,  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  inflation  fears  were  based  primarily  on  the  belief  that  low  e.x ante real  short-term  interest 
rates  and  higher  long-term  interest  rates  signaled  significant  expectations  of  inflation.  indicating  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  that  the  market  expected  rising  inflation. 
As  we  shall  see,  Chairman  Greenspan  did  not  explicitly  retreat  from  his  July  proposal  in  later 
testimonies;  however,  he  did  not  emphasize  the  real  interest  rate  target  again.  Instead,  he  focused  on 
the  role  that  inflation  expectations  play  in generating  inflation,  called  for  policy  that  would  more 
directly  take  account  of  these  expectations,  and  justified  further  interest  rate  increases  as  required  to 
lower  inflation  expectations.  In  the  next  section,  we  will  examine  two  subsequent  testimonies.  We  will 
then  test  Chairman  Greenspan’s  proposed  real  interest  rate  target  and  examine  the  appropriateness  of 
choosing  inflation  expectations  as  a  monetary  policy  target.  Our  analysis  leads  us  to  conclude  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  has  offered  neither  a workable  proposal  nor  a  reasonable  justification  for  recent 
tightening  of  policy  or,  for  that  matter,  for  continual  active  intervention  into  financial  markets.  Finally, 
we  will  close  by  suggesting  an  alternative  to  the  Federal  Reserve’s  recent  proposals. 
Chairman  Greenspan’s  Policy  Statements  of February  and  June,  1994 
In  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System’s  Monetary  Policy Report to the Congress 
Pursuant  to the Full  Employment  and Balanced  Growth Act of  1978  on  February  22,  1994,  it  was 
noted  that  “long-term  inflation  expectations  remain  stubbornly  above  recent  inflation  rates”  (BOG 
1994,  p.  1)3. According  to  the  report,  continued  accommodative  monetary  policy  would  have  “posed 
the  threat  that  capacity  pressures  would  build  in the  foreseeable  future  to  the  point  where  imbalances 
would  develop  and  inflation  would  begin  to  pick  up”  (p.  1). As  a  result,  the  FOMC  moved  to  push  up 
the  federal  funds  rate  by  one-quarter  of  one  percentage  point  in  a preemptive  strike  against  future 
12 inflation.  The  FOMC  reiterated  the  Federal  Reserve’s  belief  that  the  “historical  relationships  between 
the  aggregates  and  spending”  had  deteriorated  so  that,  “given  uncertainties  about  velocity  behavior,” 
reported  monetary  targets  would  not  be  given  as  much  weight  in  decision  making  as  they  had  been  in 
the  past. 
Monetary  policy  would  remain  focused  on  price  stability:  “In the  area  of  monetary  policy,  the 
challenge  is to  build  on  the  favorable  price  performance  of  late  in a  situation  in  which  the  economy 
will  likely  be  operating  closer  to  full  capacity  than  it has  in  recent  years.  With  success  in  keeping  the 
economy  on  course  toward  the  long-run  goal  of  price  stability,  the  prospects  for  sustained  expansion 
will  be  greatly  enhanced”  (p.  4). 
The  report  acknowledged,  however,  that  recent  and  current  evidence  did  not  indicate  that  inflation  was 
rising:  “the  CPI  for  commodities  other  than  food  and  energy  rose  only  1.6 percent  over  the  four 
quarters  of  1993,  a  percentage  point  less  than  in  1992”;  indeed,  the  rise  in the  CPI  excluding  food  and 
energy  “was  the  smallest  increase  in that  measure  in  more  than  twenty  years”  (p.  16).  Similarly,  “the 
producer  price  index  for  finished  goods  .  .  . increased  just  0.2  percent  over  the  four  quarters  of  1993. 
An  identical  increase  was  reported  in the  PPI  for  finished  goods  other  than  food  and  energy;  the 
increase  in this  measure  was  the  smallest  in  its history,  which  goes  back  to  1974”  (p.  18).  On  the  other 
hand,  “inflation  expectations,  as  reported  in various  surveys  of consumers  and  other  respondents,  flared 
up  for a time  during  1993. The  surveys  have continued  to show  one-year  expectations  of price  change 
running  somewhat  higher  than  the  actual  increases  of recent years.  Longer-run  expectations  of price 
change  have  remained  higher  still” (p.  18). 
According  to  the  BOG’s  report,  during  1993  “with  money  market  rates remaining  in a range  not  much, 
if at all, above  the  core  rate of inflation  .  .  . the  members  of the  FOMC  viewed  that  a tightening  in 
reserve  conditions  at  some  point  would  likely  be needed  to avoid  pressures  on capacity  and  a pickup 
in inflation”  (p.  19). As a result,  the  federal  funds  rate was increased  one-quarter  of one  percentage 
point  in February  1994, and  policy  tightening  has occurred  four times  since  then.  The  BOG’s  report 
admitted  that  when  policy  first became  biased toward  tightening  (in May  1993 with  the  asymmetric 
directive),  “slack in the  economy  remained  appreciable.  which  weighed  against  any  pickup  in inflation, 
but  inflation  expectations  were  in danger  of ratcheting  higher,  with  possible  adverse  consequences  for 
inflation  itself’  (p. 20). Although  unemployment  had  risen before  the  July  1993 meeting,  the  FOMC 
“agreed that  it was necessary  to remain  especially  alert to the potential  for a pickup  in inflation”  and 
retained  the  asymmetric  bias toward  tightening.  By the  August  1993 meeting  of the FOMC,  data 
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encouraging”  (p.  2 1). Even  inflation  expectations  declined,  leading  to  a  symmetric  directive,  which 
was  retained  in  September.  By  the  last  two  meetings  in  1993,  however,  the  FOMC  became  convinced 
that  the  “next  move  in  policy  would  be  to  tighten”  (p.  21).  At  the  first  meeting  of  1994,  data  on  real 
GNP  growth,  prices  of  commodities,  and  falling  slack  in  labor  and  product  markets  convinced  the 
FOMC  to  “trim  back  some  of  the  stimulus  .  .  . before  it  fed  through  to  higher  inflation”  (p.  21). 
One  justification  widely  reported  in the  press  for  the  move  toward  tighter  money  policy  was  the  belief 
that  higher  short-term  rates  would  cause  long-term  rates  to  decline.  Indeed,  President  Clinton  cited  this 
belief  in  statements  that  supported  the  Federal  Reserve’s  shift  of  policy.  on  the  expectation  that  falling 
long  rates  would  ensure  sustained  economic  growth  and  would  enable  the  administration  to  achieve 
deficit  reduction  in  line  with  projections  of  the  Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993 
(OBRA93)  (Galbraith  1994).  Governor  John  LaWare  later  indicated  that  he.  too,  thought  long-term 
rates  might  fall:  “I had  thought  that  a  move  by  us  at that  time  would  be  more  likely  to  stabilize  or 
maybe  even  bring  down  the  long-term  rate”  (Bradsher  1994).  This  was  based  on  the  “Fisher  effect” 
theory  in  which  nominal  interest  rates  are  said  to  equal  some  real  interest  rate  plus  expected  inflation. 
As  the  chairman  stated  in July  1993  and  again  in February  1994.  real  short-term  rates  were  barely 
above  zero,  while  real  long-term  rates  were  significantly  higher  (the  term  structure  of  interest  rates  --  a 
function  of  the  difference  between  long  rates  and  short  rates  --  was  abnormally  steep  because  long- 
term  rates  were  much  higher  than  short-term  rates).  According  to  the  Federal  Reserve  and  many  other 
observers,  the  high  long-term  rates  were  due  to  inflation  expectations  that  remained  stubbornly  high;  if 
expectations  of  inflation  could  be  lowered.  the  long-term  rates  would  fall.  If  the  Federal  Reserve 
pushed  up  short-term  rates  and  if this  signaled  to  markets  that  inflation  would  not  be  tolerated, 
inflation  expectations  would  be  lowered;  then  long-term  rates  would  actually  fall  and  the  yield  curve 
would  flatten  as  the  gap  between  long  rates  and  short  rates  closed.  Chairman  Greenspan  has 
emphasized  that  it  is the  long-term  interest  rate  that  is  important  to  economic  decisions. 
However,  long  rates  rose  immediately  on  the  announcement  of  the  February  change  of  policy. 
Subsequent  tightening  generally  pushed  long-term  rates  even  higher  (although  they  did  fall  temporarily 
at  some  points  in the  following  six  months),  so  that,  on  net,  long-term  mortgage  rates  rose  by  three- 
quarters  of  one  percentage  point  between  January  and  June  1994;  some  long-term  rates  rose  more  than 
the  increase  of  short-term  rates  (Galbraith  1994).  This  was  in contrast  to  the  experience  during  1993, 
when  the  short-term  rate  was  held  steady:  “longer-tern1  interest  rates  fell  as  much  as  1 percentage  point 
over  the  course  of  1993,  to  settle  at  levels  not  seen  on  a  sustained  basis  since  the  later  1960s”  (BOG 
14 1994,  p.  19).  Incongruously.  the  report  noted  that  expected  inflation  “moved  up  from  an  average  of  3.8 
percent  in the  final  quarter  of  1992  to  an  average  of  4.7  percent  in the  third  quarter  of  1993,”  and 
“longer-run  expectations  of  price  change  have  remained  higher  still”  (p,  18).  Thus.  during  1993  long- 
term  interest  rates  fell  as  short-term  rates  held  steady,  although  inflation  expectations  remained 
relatively  high  (that  is, above  actual  inflation)  and  even  increased  during  the  year  --  in  direct  contrast 
to  the  Federal  Reserve’s  argument  that  high  expected  inflation  was  keeping  long  rates  up.  However, 
the  BOG  attributed  the  falling  long-term  rates  to  investor  confidence  concerning  “prospects  for  low 
inflation  and  reduced  federal  budget  deficits”  (p.  19). 
On  June  22,  1994,  Chairman  Greenspan  presented  testimony  before  the  House  Committee  on  the 
Budget.  He  argued  that  the  FOMC  (apparently  with  the  exception  of  Governor  LaWare)  had  realized 
as  early  as  February  that  “long-term  rates  would  move  a  little  higher  temporarily  as  we  tightened,”  but 
that  even  in the  absence  of  tighter  policy  “longer-term  rates  eventually  would  have  increased 
significantly,”  reflecting  “increased  uncertainty,  as  well  as  expectations  of  a  stronger  economy” 
(Greenspan  1994b.  pp.  2-3).  This  seemed  to  indicate  that  President  Clinton  and  other  commentators 
misunderstood  the  Federal  Reserve’s  February  change  of  policy,  which  was  recognized  even  at  that 
time  by  the  FOMC  as  likely  to  push  up  long-term  rates  rather  than  reduce  them  as  many  had  been  led 
to  expect  by  the  February  report  and  by  Chairman  Greenspan’s  testimony  of  February  22,  1994. 
Presumably,  the  Fed  believed  that  long-term  rates  could  eventually  come  down  as  economic  growth 
declined,  as  inflation  expectations  fell,  and  as  uncertainty  was  reduced.  However.  the  chairman  argued 
that  uncertainty  actually  increased  because  rising  interest  rates  “triggered  a  reexamination  by  investors 
of  their  overly  sanguine  assumptions  about  price  risk  in  longer-term  financial  assets”  (p.  3).  Thus,  the 
tighter  policy  generated  a  run  out  of  long-tern1  assets  as  investors  “fled  toward  more  price-certain 
investments  at  the  short  end  of  the  yield  curve”  (p.  3).  This  run  was  intensified  by  flows  out  of  bond 
mutual  funds  as  “investors,  fearing  further  rate  increases  and  awakening  to  the  nature  of  the  risk  they 
had  taken  on,  shifted  funds  back  into  shorter-term  money  market  mutual  funds  and  into  deposits”  (p. 
3).  Chairman  Greenspan  acknowledged  that  the  Federal  Reserve  had  realized  that  its  policy  change 
“could  impart  uncertainty  to  financial  markets,”  but  believed  “timely  action”  would  reduce  “the  degree 
and  frequency  of  tightening  that  might  be  needed  in the  future”  (pp.  3-4).  Thus,  Chairman  Greenspan 
admitted  that  the  February  and  subsequent  testimony  and  policy  actions  contributed  to  rising 
uncertainty,  to  rising  expectations  of  further  interest  rate  hikes,  and  to  a  run  out  of  the  longer-term  end 
of  the  market  that  raised  long  rates.  But  this  was justified  on  the  basis  that  even  greater  short-term 
interest  rate  hikes  would  have  been  required  in the  absence  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  preemptive  strike. 
Thus,  the  Fed  conceded  that  its February  tightening  increased  uncertainty,  generated  a  run  out  of 
15 longer-term  assets,  and  pushed  up  long-term  rates  --  all  of  which  were  the  opposite  of  results 
anticipated  by  many  observers  at  the  time  of  the  tightening,  but  were  the  results  that  the  Fed  had 
privately  expected. 
As  the  Chairman  put  it,  “some  critics  of  our  latest  policy  actions  have  noted  that  we  tightened  policy 
even  though  inflation  had  not  picked  up.  That  observation  is accurate.  but  is not  relevant  to  policy 
decisions”  (p.  4).  This  is because  “shifts  in the  stance  of  monetary  policy  influence  the  economy  and 
inflation  with  a  considerable  lag,  as  long  as  a year  or  more  .  .  . the  challenge  of  monetary  policy  is to 
interpret  current  data  on  the  economy  and  financial  markets  with  an  eye  to  anticipating  future 
inflationary  or  contractionary  forces  and  to  countering  them  by  taking  action  in advance”  (p.  4).  The 
emphasis  of  policy,  therefore,  must  be  on  variables  that  can  predict  inflation  far  enough  in advance 
that  policy  changes  can  be  undertaken  at  least  a year  in advance  of  the  emergence  of  inflationary 
pressures. 
Unfortunately,  the  Federal  Reserve  systematically  examined  and  rejected  virtually  every  economic 
variable  traditionally  thought  to  predict  forthcoming  inflation.  First,  Chairman  Greenspan  rejected 
“high  levels  of  resource  utilization”  as  good  predictors  of  inflation,  because  “through  much  of  this 
nation’s  history,  we  had  periods  of  tightened  labor  and  product  markets  with  only  transitory  effects  on 
the  general  price  level”  (pp.  4-5).  In three  separate  testimonies  he  rejected  the  use  of  monetary  growth 
rates  as  indicators  of  future  inflation.  He  rejected  the  traditional  Phillips  curve,  arguing  “over  the 
longer  term,  no  trade-off  is evident  between  inflation  and  unemployment”  (p.  6).  Further,  he  dismissed 
capacity  utilization  as  a  predictor  of  inflation.  He  noted  that  rising  capacity  will  help  to  reduce 
inflationary  pressures,  and  the  “Federal  Reserve’s  own  index  of  output  capacity  in  manufacturing 
increased  2.25  percent  last  year  and  is  likely  to  surpass  that  performance  in  1994,”  thus,  reducing  any 
inflationary  pressures.  In  any  case,  “firms  historically  have  been  able  to  ‘stretch’  capacity  .  . . [thus]  .  .  . 
there  is no  clear-cut  ‘trigger  point’  for  capacity  utilization  as  a  signal  for  emerging  inflationary 
pressures”  (p.  9).  Similarly,  in testimony  before  the  Joint  Economic  Committee  of  Congress  on 
January  3 1,  1994,  Chairman  Greenspan  had  emphasized  that  “the  rate  of  price  change  depends 
crucially  on  price  expectations,  and  not  on  the  degree  of  slack”  (Bradsher  1994). 
In  earlier  testimony  Chairman  Greenspan  had  noted  that  present  and  recent  inflation  figures  did  not 
appear  to  be  rising  and  stated  that  oil  prices  were  actually  declining.  Although  some  commodity  prices 
had  risen  in  early  1994,  he  argued  that  “in  the  past  such  price  data  have  often  been  an  indication  more 
of  strength  in  new  orders  and  activity  than  a precursor  of  rising  inflation  throughout  the  economy.  In 
16 the  current  period,  overall  cost  and  price  pressures  still  appear  to  remain  damped”  (Greenspan  1994a, 
p.  11).  Along  the  same  lines,  he  dismissed  wage  increases  as  a possible  inflationary  source,  noting  that 
“advances  in productivity  early  this  year  are  holding  down  unit  labor  costs”  (p.  1  I).  He  dismissed 
rising  private  borrowing  as  well,  having  been  shown  to  be  “a highly  imperfect  indicator  of  inflation  in 
recent  years”  (p.  11).  Finally,  he  observed  that  “fiscal  restraint  and  weak  foreign  economies”  will  have 
some  disinflationary  effects,  but  believed  the  effects  “are  likely  to  be  less  than  feared”  (p.  16). 
Finally,  Chairman  Greenspan  had  earlier  dismissed  current  inflation  as  only  of  “limited  use  as  a  guide 
to  the  appropriateness  of  current  instrument  settings”  (Greenspan  1994a.  p.  14).  In  addition  to  the 
inherent  lags  involved,  he  argued  that  “price  measurements  over  short  time  spans  are  subject  to 
transitory  special  factors”  (p.  14).  Indeed,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  concern  with  inflation  and  inflation 
expectations  conflicts  with  accumulating  evidence  that  conventional  measures  of  inflation  are  seriously 
upwardly  biased.  Peter  Schulkin  (1993)  notes  that  conventional  indexes  mismeasure  improvements  of 
quality,  substitution  of  cheaper  goods  (taken  into  account  only  once  each  decade).  and  purchases  at 
discount  outlets,  and  these  measures  include  taxes  (so  that  rising  taxes  are  counted  as  inflation).  Even 
the  BOG  concludes  that  inflation  measures  are  biased  upward  by  as  much  as  1.8 percentage  points 
(although  it adopts  1.0 percentage  point  as  the  most  likely  bias).  Michael  Bryan  and  Stephen  Cecchetti 
(1993)  cite  studies  showing  that  the  bias  due  to  introduction  of  new  goods  adds  0.5  to  1  .O percentage 
points  to  measured  inflation;  the  discount  outlet  substitution  bias  is estimated  to  be  0.25  to  2.0 
percentage  points  for  food  and  0.25  to  1.0 percentage  points  for  energy.  Given  these  measurement 
errors,  the  CPI  target  or  Chairman  Greenspan’s  zero  inflation  target  would  actually  lead  to  deflation. 
Indeed,  current  inflation  figures  are  nearly  within  the  upper  limit  of  the  range  the  BOG  admits  could 
represent  merely  measurement  error. 
The  variables  traditionally  used  to  predict  inflation  were  rejected  on  the  basis  that  they  have  performed 
poorly  in the  past  or  that  their  current  values  do  not  indicate  inflation  is  imminent  or  both.  Chairman 
Greenspan  suggested  that  the  Federal  Reserve  will  continue  to  use  a  number  of  indicators  as  a  basis  of 
policy,  even  though  he  listed  only  “credit  market  developments”  (Greenspan  1994a.  p.  18).  Much  of 
his  February  22,  1994  testimony,  however,  was  devoted  to  the  role  that  inflation  expectations  play  and 
to  the  use  of  inflation  expectations  “as a  direct  guide  to  policy”  (p.  14).  According  to  Chairman 
Greenspan: 
A clear  lesson  we  have  learned  over  the  decades  since  World  War  II  is the  key  role  of 
inflation  expectations  in the  inflation  process  .  .  . lower  inflation  and  inflation  expectations 
reduce  uncertainty  in  economic  planning  and  diminish  risk  premiums  for  capita1  investment. 
17 [The]  reduced  inflation  expectations  of  recent  years  have  been  accompanied  by  lower  bond  and 
mortgage  interest  rates.  slower  actual  inflation,  falling  trend  unemployment,  and  faster  trend 
productivity  growth.  [The] implication  is clear: when it comes to inflation  expectations,  the 
nearer zero,  the better.  It  follows  that  price  stability,  with  inflation  expectations  essentially 
negligible,  should  be  a  long-run  goal  of  macroeconomic  policy.  We  will  be  at  price  stability 
when  households  and  businesses  need  not  factor  expectations  of  changes  in  the  average  level 
of  prices  into  their  decisions.  How  these  expectations  form  is not  always  easy  to  discern,  and 
they  can  for  periods  of  time  appear  to  be  at  variance  with  underlying  forces.  (p.  13, emphasis 
added) 
In  conclusion,  he  claimed  Federal  Reserve  policy  had  helped  to  lower  inflation  expectations  over  the 
past  several  years  even  while  it had  been  accommodative;  according  to  Chairman  Greenspan,  even 
easy  money  policy  can  lower  inflation  expectations  if  it  is  “in the  context  of  a  thorough  analysis  of  the 
prevailing  situation”  (p.  13). High  expected  inflation,  then,  could  be  fought  either  with  tight  or  easy 
money  policy,  depending  on  the  “context.”  One  could  not  necessarily  determine  whether  the  Fed  was 
fighting  inflation  by  merely  examining  the  tightness  of  policy  since  easy  policy  could  fight  inflation  if 
it  lowered  expectations.  In  evaluating  the  Federal  Reserve’s  current  policy,  Chairman  Greenspan 
provided  the  method  to  be  employed:  “The  test  of  successful  monetary  policy  in such  a  business  cycle 
phase  is our  ability  to  limit  the  upward  movement  of  long-term  rates  from  what  it would  otherwise 
have  been  with  less  effective  policy”  (p.  14).  If  policy  lowers  long-term  rates,  it  is successmlly 
fighting  inflation. 
Applying  the  proverbial  “the  proof  is in the  pudding”  test,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  policy  shift  since 
February  1994  has  been  a  resounding  failure  by  Chairman  Greenspan’s  own  criteria  (see  also  Galbraith 
1994).  Long-term  interest  rates  immediately  rose.  as  we  mentioned  earlier,  indicating  either  that  the 
shift  in policy  led  markets  to  believe  inflation  would  be  higher  than  they  had  previously  expected  or 
that  the  steep  yield  curve  actually  reflected  the  fear  that  the  Federal  Reserve  would  raise  interest  rates 
(rather than  a fear of  inflation).  As acknowledged  in the June  1994 testimony,  the Federal  Reserve’s 
action  led to a run out  of the  long  end  of the  market  (which  was in contrast  to the  Federal  Reserve’s 
desire,  if it wanted  to stimulate  sustainable,  long-term  growth),  as, according  to Chairman  Greenspan, 
investors  “fearing  further  rate  increases  and  awakening  to the  nature  of the  risk they  had  taken  on” 
shifted  back  to shorter  term  assets  (Greenspan  1994b, p. 3). Thus,  long-term  rates  had been  high 
because  the  market  quite  correctly  feared  “further rate increases”;  once  these  became  a reality,  the 
bond  market  plummeted  and  stock  prices  experienced  increased  volatility  because  additional  rate hikes 
18 were  feared. 
Over  the  past  year  the  radical  shift  in policy  announced  by  Chairman  Greenspan  in  four  testimonies,  as 
well  as  the  five  occasions  on  which  the  Federal  Reserve  raised  short-term  interest  rates,  violated  the 
goals  of  monetary  policy  as  laid  out  by  the  chairman  in June  1994:  “Most  importantly  we  can 
reinforce  ongoing  trends  in the  private  sector  that  enhance  our  productive  potential  by  helping  to 
create  a  stable  environment  for  sustainable  noninflationary  economic  growth.  Stability  in  economic 
conditions  boosts  confidence  and  makes  long-range  planning  by  businesses  and  households  much 
easier”  (Greenspan  1994b.  p.  11).  Unstable  interest  rates,  uncertainty  over  actions  to  be  taken  at 
FOMC  meetings,  and  unstable  exchange  rates  generated  by  rudderless  central  bank  policy  have  all 
reduced  stability,  confidence,  and  the  ability  to  engage  in  long-run  planning.  The  upward  movement  of 
interest  rates  will  increase  the  government  deficit  (directly  through  interest  payments  on  government 
debt  and  indirectly  through  lower  tax  revenues),  raise  the  burden  on  debtors  (the  typical  home 
mortgage  payment  rose  by  $ IO0 per  month  this  spring),  reduce  some  interest-sensitive  spending,  and 
slow  the  growth  of  employment  as  it  retards  the  recovery.  If  this  leads  to  lower  investment,  it  will  also 
lead  to  lower  growth  of  productivity  and  capacity  --  exactly  the  opposite  effect  predicted  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board.  Finally,  there  is no  evidence  (yet)  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  moves  since 
February  have  lowered  inflation  expectations,  and  the  policy  has  caused  investors  to  shun  the  long- 
term  end  of  the  market  because  of  the  fear  of  further  rate  hikes  that  would  cause  capital  losses.  The 
yield  curve  will  remain  steep  because  high  long-term  rates  are  required  to  compensate  holders  of  long- 
term  bonds  for  the  capital  losses  they  would  suffer  when  the  Fed  further  tightens.  By  Chairman 
Greenspan’s  test  (falling  long-term  rates).  the  policy  is clearly  a  failure  and  did  not  lead  to  the  desired 
result. 
On  a  different  but  related  score.  investors  recently  have  bet  against  the  dollar,  causing  it to  reach 
postwar  lows  against  the  yen  (and  also  to  fall  against  the  mark).  Many  analysts  had  called  on  the 
Federal  Reserve  to  try  to  defend  the  dollar  with  an  interest  rate  hike  at  its July  meeting,  but  the 
Federal  Reserve  waited  until  August  to  raise  interest  rates  again.  In  any  case,  analysts  have  argued  that 
speculators  are  trying  to  force  the  hand  of  the  Federal  Reserve  to  see  whether  it will  defend  the  dollar 
with  higher  interest  rates;  should  the  Federal  Reserve  (and  other  central  banks)  attempt  to  do  so  but 
fail,  spectacular  profits  can  be  made.  We  do  not  believe  there  is a  “dollar  crisis”  and  suspect  that 
uncertainties  generated  by  recent  Federal  Reserve  policy  played  some  role  in  creating  problems  in the 
market  for  dollars.  It  should  be  noted  that  before  February  1994,  even  with  low  and  stable  short-term 
interest  rates,  with  an  economy  that  was  outperforming  those  of  nearly  all  our  trading  partners,  with 
19 inflation  averaging  2.75  percent  for  1993  (the  same  as  for  early  1994),  the  United  States  faced  no 
dollar  “crisis.”  The  run  on  the  dollar  began  only  after  the  policy  shift  and  after  interest  rates  rose,  that 
is,  after  the  Federal  Reserve’s  policy  change  created  uncertainty  and  caused  losses  in  bond  and  stock 
markets.  It  is now  apparent  that  foreign  investors,  like  domestic  investors,  are  avoiding  the  long  end  of 
the  market.  The  premium  that  must  be  paid  by  long-term  assets  over  that  paid  by  short-term  assets 
must  be  sufficient  to  compensate  holders  for  capital  losses  that  will  occur  when  the  Federal  Reserve 
raises  interest  rates  further.  For  this  reason,  it  is unlikely  that  a tighter  money  policy  would  be  able  to 
stem  a  run  out  of  dollar-denominated  long-term  assets  because  the  likely  capital  losses  would  swamp 
any  rise  of  yields  due  to  tighter  policy.  Indeed,  any  reasoned  analysis  should  have  predicted  that  rather 
than  calming  any  inflation  fears  foreign  investors  might  have  had,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  recent 
tightening  only  generated  capital  losses  and  disrupted  the  long  end  of  the  market. 
An Ex Post  Scorecard  for Chairman  Greenspan’s  Policy: Would  Random  Policy  be Better? 
While  the  Federal  Reserve’s  current  policy  clearly  failed  by  Chairman  Greenspan’s  own  test,  we 
analyzed  the  data  since  1959  to  determine  how  well  Chairman  Greenspan’s  proposals  would  have 
fared  had  they  been  adopted  in the  past.  We  must  from  the  outset  state  some  caveats. 
First,  when  Chairman  Greenspan  advocated  a  real  interest  rate  target,  he  did  not  state  what  the 
“equilibrium”  real  rate  would  be  and,  in  fact,  hinted  that  it might  vary  depending  on  economic 
conditions.  However,  most  economists  who  adopt  an  equilibrium  approach  argue  that  the  economy 
cannot  remain  out  of  equilibrium  for  an  extended  length  of  time.  Thus.  over  a  long  period  the 
economy  should  be  “near”  equilibrium  on  average;  while  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate  might  vary 
(due  to  shocks  to  the  economy)  over  the  very  short  run,  over  long  periods  it should  remain  relatively 
stable.  (This  would  not  be  true  of  nominal  interest  rates,  fluctuations  of  which  would  depend  on 
inflation  expectations  according  to  the  Fisher  effect.)  We  take  the  long-term  average  real  interest  rate 
as  a  proxy  for  the  equilibrium  rate.  while  recognizing  that  this  will  introduce  error  into  the  analysis 
should  permanent  changes  to  economic  conditions  (structural  shifts)  have  occurred  over  the  period. 
Second,  Chairman  Greenspan  does  not  define  terms  such  as  “accelerating  inflation”  and  “disinflation” 
and  so  on  sufficiently  well  to  operationalize  them.  We  define  accelerating  inflation  as  an  increase  of 
inflation  by  one  percentage  point  or  more  within  one  year,  and  disinflation  as  a  decrease  by  one 
percentage  point  or  more  within  one  year.  This  is admittedly  somewhat  arbitrary;  however,  we  believe 
that  changes  less  than  this  would  probably  not  be  viewed  as  significant.  Furthermore.  the  standard 
20 deviation  of  inflation  over  this  period  is about  three  percentage  points;  relative  to  the  standard 
deviation,  a  one  percentage  point  change  of  inflation  is significant  enough  that  it probably  would  not 
be  dismissed  as  “white  noise.” 
Insert Figure  2 
Note:  Figure  represents  the  inflation  rate  as  measured  by  quarterly  changes  in the  consumer  price 
index  and  expected  inflation  as  measured  by  the  University  of  Michigan’s  Expected  Inflation  series 
one  year  foreward  forecast.  The  authors’  wish  to  acknowledge  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland 
for  assistance  with  this  data. 
Finally,  we  test  whether  real  interest  rates  can  predict  if  capacity  utilization  will  increase  or  decrease 
by  a  “significant”  amount,  In  this  cast,  we  use  a  change  of  capacity  utilization  by  two  percentage 
points  or  more  over  a year  as  a  measure  of  significance;  the  standard  deviation  was  about  4.5  over  this 
period.  Again,  we  admit  that  this  is somewhat  arbitrary.  In  our  first  test  of  Chairman  Greenspan’s  rule, 
we  will  use  an  ex post  real  interest  rate  --  obtained  by  subtracting  actual  inflation  from  nominal  short- 
term  interest  rates  --  to  eliminate  problems  of  measurement  of  inflation  expectations  and  gaps  in  data. 
Over  the  very  short  run  expected  inflation  is highly  correlated  with  actual  inflation;  as  we  will  use  a 
three-month  interest  rate,  there  will  be  little  difference  between  the  ex post  and  ex  anle  real  rates.  (See 
Figures  2  and  3  for  a  comparison  of  actual  and  expected  inflation  for  a portion  of  the  period  under 
examination.) 
Insert  Figure 3 
Note:  Figure  represents  the  annualized,  real  ex-ante  and  Rx-post  short-term  interest  rates  on  three- 
month  Treasury  bills. 
If  the  Federal  Reserve  had  adopted  a  real  interest  rate  target  in the  past,  how  often  would  it  have 
correctly  read  economic  conditions?  Over  the  entire  examined  period  the  real  em post  short-term 
interest  rate  averaged  just  less  than  1.5 percent,  with  a  maximum  of  nearly  9.5  percent  and  a  minimum 
of  -5.5  percent.  Assuming  that  the  average  real  rate  of  I .5  percent  is a proxy  for  Chairman 
Greenspan’s  “equilibrium”  real  rate,  then  a  real  rate  above  this  should  indicate  an  economy  facing 
disinflationary  pressures,  and  a  rate  below  this  should  presage  dangers  of  accelerating  inflation.  At  the 
same  time  the  average  inflation  rate  achieved  over  the  period  was  4.7  percent,  with  a  maximum  of 
15.8  percent  and  a  minimum  of  -2.2  percent;  the  average  capacity  utilization  rate  over  the  period  was 
82  percent  with  a  minimum  of  71  percent  and  a  maximum  of  92  percent. 




12  8  4 
30  4  26 
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of 
Quarters  with  Real  Quarters  with  Quarters  with 
STr  <  1.5  Percent  Inflation  >  4.7  Inflation  <  4.7 
Percent  Percent 
20  166 
10  1  60  1959.2-1971.1  25  8  17 
1971.2-1983.1  36  28  8  26  28 
I 
1983.2-1993.3  12  4  8  0  1 100 
Note:  Str  is  the  real  short-term  interest  rate  as  measured  by  subtracting  the  inflation  rate  (as  measured  by  the  rate  of  increase  of  the  consumer  price  index)  from  the 
three-month  Treasury  bill  rate.  Owing  to  data  limitations,  it  was  assumed  that  the  inflation  rate  will  not  rise  above  2.3  percent  within  four  quarters  following 
1993.3.  Inflation  is  measured  as  the  quarterly  rate  of  change  in  the  consumer  price  index. 
Source:  Authors’  calculations  based  on  National  Income  and  Product  Account. 
Table  1 is a  “scorecard”  for  Chairman  Greenspan’s  proposed  policy.  Assume  that  he  plans  to 
implement  tight  policy  when  the  real  interest  rate  drops  below  1.5 percent  to  fight  what  he  believes  are 
inflationary  pressures  and  to  implement  easy  policy  when  the  real  interest  rate  is above  1.5 percent.  As 
Table  1 shows,  there  were  65  quarters  in which  Chairman  Greenspan  would  have  adopted  easy  policy. 
However,  48  of  these  quarters  were  followed  by  accelerating  inflation  (as  discussed  above,  defined  as 
a  rise  of  inflation  by  one  percentage  point  or  more  within  the  following  four  quarters),  so  Chairman 
Greenspan’s  policy  would  have  been  mistaken  74  percent  of  the  time.  Indeed,  as  the  table  shows,  he 
would  have  adopted  the  incorrect  policy  96  percent  of  the  time  between  1959.2  and  1971 .l,  50  percent 
of  the  time  between  197 1.1 and  1983.1,  and  66  percent  of  the  time  between  1983.2  and  1993.3. 
The  policy  would  not  have  worked  much  better  during  periods  of  low  real  rates,  when  he  would  have 
adopted  tight  policy  on  the  expectation  that  inflation  would  accelerate.  There  were  73  quarters  in 
which  the  real  rate  fell  below  1.5 percent.  suggesting  to  Chairman  Greenspan  that  tight  money  policy 
would  be  required  to  stem  future  inflation.  However,  37  of  these  quarters  were  followed  by  declining 
inflation.  This  policy  would  have  been  incorrect  100 percent  of  the  time  between  1983.2  and  1993.3, 
28  percent  of  the  time  between  1971.2  and  1983.1,  and  60  percent  of  the  time  between  1959.2  and 
1971.1,  for  an  overall  score  of  5 1 percent  incorrect  policy  responses. 
22 In  addition,  the  real  interest  rate  often  misinterprets  the  “tightness”  of  the  economy  as  measured  by  the 
capacity  utilization  rate  (Table  2).  Chairman  Greenspan  claims  that  when  the  real  short-term  interest 
rate  is below  “equilibrium,”  bottlenecks  will  follow  as  capacity  utilization  rises.  This  would  generate 
inflation.  In  other  words,  when  the  short-term  interest  rate  is below  1.5 percent,  capacity  utilization  is 
expected  to  rise,  generating  inflationary  pressures  that  can  be  lessened  if the  Federal  Reserve  adopts 
tight  policy.  Similarly,  when  the  real  interest  rate  is above  I.5  percent,  capacity  utilization  is  expected 
to  fall.  As  Table  2 shows,  there  were  65  quarters  when  the  real  rate  was  above  1.5 percent  and  73 
quarters  when  it  was  below  1.5 percent.  When  the  real  rate  was  above  1.5 percent,  the  capacity 
utilization  rate  tended  to  be  below  its  long-run  average  (82  percent);  this  is consistent  with  Chairman 
Greenspan’s  belief,  but  it  should  be  noted  that  even  in this  case,  high  real  interest  rates  are  associated 
with  high  capacity  utilization  38  percent  of  the  time.  (Furthermore,  the  correlation  says  nothing  about 
causation:  it  is possible  that  low  capacity  utilization  is associated  with  low  inflation  which  causes  high 
real,  or  residual,  interest  rates.)  When  real  rates  are  below  1.5 percent,  the  capacity  utilization  rate  is 
just  as  likely  to  be  above  normal  as  it  is to  be  below  normal.  which  contradicts  Chairman  Greenspan’s 
belief.  However,  from  Chairman  Greenspan’s  perspective,  real  rates  are  more  important  as  predictors 
of  future  bottlenecks  or  slack.  Therefore,  we  examined  the  four-quarter  period  following  each  real 
interest  rate  observation  to  see  whether  a real  rate  below  1.5 percent  predicts  rising  capacity  utilization 
rates  and  whether  a  real  rate  above  1.5 percent  indicates  falling  capacity  utilization  rates.  As  discussed 
above,  we  define  a  rise  or  fall  of  capacity  utilization  as an  increase  or  decrease  of  capacity  utilization 
by  two  percentage  points  or  more  over  any  quarter  within  four  quarters  of  the  period  under 
observation.  This  is actually  a  relatively  relaxed  condition  as there  is wide  fluctuation  of  capacity 
utilization  rates  over  the  typical  four  quarter  period. 
TABLE  2 Chairman  Greenspan’s  Scorecard:  Capacity  Utilization 
Period  Number  of 
Quarters  with 
Real  STr  > 
1.5 Percent 
Number  of  Number  of 
Quarters  with  Quarters  with 
Capacity  Capacity 
Utilization  >  Utilization  < 
82  Percent  82  Percent 
1959.2-  23 
1971.1 
Number  of 
Quarters 








Policy  (%) 
9 
23 1971.2-  12  0  12  7  1 42 
1983.1 
1983.2-193.3  30 
Period  Number  of 
Quarters  with 






1983.2-  12  0  12  4  67 
1993.3 
:e (as  measured  ote:  Str  1s the  al  short-term  mt  rest  rate  as  mea  rred  by  subtract]  g the  inflation 
by  the  rate  of  increase  of  the  consumer  price  index)  from  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate.  Due  to 
data  limitations,  it  was  assumed  that  capacity  utilization  will  not  fall  below  78.8  percent  or  rise  above 
82.8  percent  within  four  quarters  following  1993.3. 
Sources:  Authors’  calculations  based  on  National  Income  and  Product  Account;  The  Forecasting 
Center  of  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute. 
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19  47 
As  Table  2 shows,  when  the  real  rate  is above  1.5 percent  (suggesting  to  Chairman  Greenspan  that 
easy  money  policy  is  required  to  prevent  depressionary  influences),  the  chairman  would  have  chosen 
the  wrong  policy  61  percent  of  the  time  between  1959.2  and  197 1. I,  42  percent  of  the  time  between 
1971.2  and  1983.1,  and  90  percent  of  the  time  between  1983.2  and  1993.3.  for  an  overall  average  of 
71  percent  incorrect  policy  choices.  In  other  words,  in  most  cases,  relatively  high  real  interest  rates  did 
not  foretell  falling  capacity  utilization  rates,  so  that  easy  policy  was  not  indicated.  (By  a  stricter  test,  in 
which  the  average  capacity  utilization  over  the  four  quarters  following  the  quarter  under  observation 
falls  by  two  percentage  points,  Chairman  Greenspan  would  have  chosen  the  incorrect  policy  more  than 
78  percent  of  the  time.)  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  real  rate  is below  I .5 percent  (suggesting  to 
24 Chairman  Greenspan  that  tight  money  policy  is required  to  prevent  bottlenecks),  the  chairman  would 
have  chosen  the  incorrect  policy  68  percent  of  the  time  between  1959.2  and  197 1.1,47  percent  of  the 
time  between  1971.2  and  1983.1,  and  67  percent  of  the  time  between  1983.2  and  1993.3,  for  an 
overall  average  of  58  percent  incorrect  policy  responses.  These  tests,  then.  lead  us  to  conclude  that  real 
interest  rates  do  not  correctly  predict  future  capacity  utilization  rates  and  cannot  be  used  to  guide 
monetary  policy  designed  to  affect  capacity  utilization  with  a  lag  of  up  to  a year. 
It  should  be  noted  that  these  tests  assume  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  actually  adopt  the  “correct”  (that 
is,  Chairman  Greenspan’s)  policy.  For  example,  if the  Federal  Reserve  adopted  tight  policy  each  time 
the  real  rate  fell  below  1.5 percent,  this  would  (according  to  Chairman  Greenspan’s  theory)  prevent 
inflation  so  that  Table  1 would  report  a policy  error  (because  the  low  real  interest  rate  would  not  be 
followed  by  inflation).  This  would  require  either  that  the  target  chosen  in the  past  (whatever  it might 
have  been)  is consistently  correlated  with  Chairman  Greenspan’s  target  or  that  policy  just  happened  to 
react  in a  manner  consistent  with  Chairman  Greenspan’s  proposal.  Thus,  the  results  of  Table  1 will 
hold  only  if policy  in the  past  was  “random”  with  respect  to  Chairman  Greenspan’s  target  variable.  If 
the  Federal  Reserve  actually  (perhaps  unknowingly)  followed  Chairman  Greenspan’s  rule,  then  the 
table  might  report  a  score  of  100 percent  wrong  policy  responses;  if the  Federal  Reserve  had  actually 
adopted  perverse  policy  (that  is, the  opposite  of  Chairman  Greenspan’s  rule),  then  the  table  could 
report  no  policy  errors. 
In  order  to  test  whether  the  Federal  Reserve  was  unknowingly  adopting  Chairman  Greenspan’s  policy, 
we  analyzed  Federal  Reserve  discount  window  policy  to  determine  whether  an  observation  of  a  real 
short-term  interest  rate  above  1.5 percent  was  followed  within  three  quarters  by  monetary  ease,  defined 
as  a  decrease  of  the  discount  rate  by  at  least  one-quarter  of  one  percentage  point  within  three  quarters. 
Similarly,  when  the  real  interest  rate  was  below  1.5 percent,  “correct”  policy  would  have  raised  the 
discount  rate  by  at  least  one-quarter  of  one  percentage  point  within  three  quarters.  Of  course,  the 
parameters  of  this  test  are  somewhat  arbitrary.  However,  Chairman  Greenspan’s  intention  appears  to  be 
to  adopt  policy  that  could  operate  with  a  lag  of  about  a  year.  Real  interest  rates  can  be  calculated  at 
least  monthly.  It  is reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Federal  Reserve  could  and  would  respond  within 
three  quarters  to  a  change  of  real  interest  rates  if  it were  to  pursue  Chairman  Greenspan’s  proposal. 
We  have  adopted  a  one-quarter  of  one  percentage  point  change  to  the  discount  rate  as  the  minimum 
significant  change  on  the  basis  of  recent  Federal  Reserve  behavior.  (We  have  used  the  discount  rate 
rather  than  the  federal  funds  rate  in  order  to  reduce  the  influence  of  demand-side  market  forces  so  we 
can  focus  on  Federal  Reserve  policy;  we  recognize,  however,  that  recent  Federal  Reserve  policy  has 
25 focused  on the  federal  funds  rate rather than  on the  discount  rate.) Table  3 presents  the  results. 
TABLE  3  Actual  Policy  Adopted 
Period  Number  of  Quarters  with  Real 
STr  >  1.5  Percent 
Tight  Policy  Adopted 
1959.2-1971.1  23  5 
1971.2-1983.1  12  7 





Number  of  Quarters  with  Real  Tight  Policy  Adopted 
STr  <  1.5  Percent 
25  3 
36  II 
12  5 
I 




Easy  Policy  Adopted 
10 
19 
Note:  Str  is the  real  short-term  interest  rate  as measured  by  subtracting  the intlation  rate (as  measured  by  the  rate  of  increase  of  the  consumer  price  index)  from  the 
three-month  Treasury  bill  rate.  Easy  policy  is detined  as a decrease  of  the discount  rate  by  one-quarter  of  one  percentage  point  or  more  within  three  quarters;  tight 
policy  is defined  as an  increase  of  the  discount  rate  by one-quarter  of  one percentage  point  or  more  within  three  quarters. 
As  Table  3 shows,  when  the  real  short-term  rate  is above  1.5 percent,  the  Federal  Reserve  is more 
likely  to  adopt  tight  money  policy  (an  incorrect  response)  than  it  is to  adopt  easy  money  policy.  It 
adopts  Chairman  Greenspan’s  “correct”  policy  only  29  percent  of  the  time  (19  out  of  65  quarters).  On 
the  other  hand,  when  the  real  rate  is below  1.5 percent,  the  Federal  Reserve  is much  more  likely  to 
adopt  easy  policy  (“incorrect”),  adopting  the  “correct”  (tight)  policy  26  percent  of  the  time  (19  out  of 
73  quarters  --  although  some  of  this  might  be  attributed  to  the  Federal  Reserve’s  bias  toward  tight 
policy,  which  was  adopted  50  times,  while  easy  policy  was  adopted  45  times).  The  Federal  Reserve 
adopts  perverse  policy  40  percent  of  the  time  when  the  real  interest  rate  is above  1.5 percent  and  42 
percent  of  the  time  when  it  is below  1.5 percent  (it  takes  no  policy  action  about  30  percent  of  the 
time).  Table  3 shows  that  the  incorrect  policy  responses  of  Tables  1 and  2 cannot  be  attributed  to  the 
Fed’s  unknowing  adoption  of  Chairman  Greenspan’s  policy. 
We  ran  a  test  that  would  combine  the  real  interest  rate  signal,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  reaction,  and  the 
eventual  results.  If  the  real  interest  rate  signal  predicts  inflation.  the  Federal  Reserve  does  not  tighten, 
and  inflation  still  does  not  occur,  this  is unambiguously  a case  in which  the  real  interest  rate  target 
gives  the  wrong  signal.  In  contrast,  the  real  interest  rate  signal  is unambiguously  correct  when  it 
signals  inflation,  the  Fed  does  not  ease  policy,  and  inflation  occurs.  All  other  cases  would  involve 
some  ambiguity.  Table  4  presents  the  results. 
26 Table  4  Real  Interest  Rates,  Federal  Reserve  Reaction,  and  Inflation 
Number  of  Quarters  in  Number  of  these 
which  Real  STr  <  1.5  Quarters  =  Fed  Does 
Percent  Not  Tighten  Policy 
13  39 
Number  of  these 
Quarters  =  Fed  Does 
Not  Ease  Policy 
38 
vote:  Str  IS the  real  short-term  Interest  rate  as measured  by  subtractmg  the mflatmn  rate  (as  measured  by  the  rate  of  increase  of  the  consumer 
price  index)  from  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate 
As  Table  4  shows,  there  were  73  quarters  in which  the  real  interest  rate  was  less  than  1.5 percent, 
signaling  to  Chairman  Greenspan  that  inflation  should  accelerate.  Of  these,  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not 
tighten  policy  39  times  (an  incorrect  policy  response);  it did  not  loosen  policy  38  times  (this  includes 
34  quarters  after  which  policy  was  tightened,  plus  four  in  which  the  Federal  Reserve  took  no  action). 
Of  the  quarters  in  which  the  Federal  Reserve  reacted  incorrectly,  only  9 were  actually  followed  by 
acceleration  of  inflation,  while  30  were  not.  This  means  that  the  real  interest  rate  unambiguously  gave 
the  wrong  signal  30  times  out  of  the  73  quarters  in which  it  signaled  accelerating  inflation,  or  41 
percent  of  the  time.  Of  the  38  quarters  in which  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  loosen  policy,  28  were 
followed  by  acceleration  of  inflation  and  10 were  not.  Thus,  the  real  interest  rate  target  unambiguously 
gave  the  correct  signal  28  times  out  of  73  quarters.  or  38  percent  of  the  time.  In  conclusion.  once  we 
focus  only  on  the  unambiguous  cases,  we  find  that  the  real  interest  rate  target  gives  the  wrong  signal 
more  often  than  it gives  the  correct  signal  regarding  accelerating  inflation. 
Chairman  Greenspan  has  also  claimed  that  expected  inflation  is a  good  predictor  of  future  inflation; 
indeed,  expected  inflation  seems  to  be  the  only  guide  analyzed  by  the  chairman  that  has  yet  to  be 
dismissed,  We  will  first  analyze  whether  expected  inflation  has  been  a good  predictor  of  inflation  and 
then  determine  whether  use  of  expected  inflation  in the  past  would  have  led  to  correct  policy 
responses.  In  1980  respondents  to  surveys  predicted  inflation  would  average  9 percent  over  the  next 
decade;  actual  inflation  turned  out  to  be  only  half  that.  “This  peak  in  IO-year  expectations  occurred 
about  eight  years  after  (ex posr)  inflation  peaked  and  converged  only  slowly  to  the  lower  level  of 
inflation  experienced  in the  decade”  (Carlson  1993).  Any  policy  based  on  longer-term  inflation 
expectations  during  the  1980s  would  have  seriously  overestimated  inflationary  pressures. 
Indeed,  the  evidence  suggests  that  rather  than  expected  inflation  predicting  inflation,  inflation 
expectations  are  formed  on  the  basis  of  current  inflation  along  with  past  inflation4  To  determine 
27 whether  expected  inflation  would  serve  as  a  useful  target  for  monetary  policy,  we  looked  at  data  since 
1978  (owing  to  data  limitations,  we  could  not  examine  earlier  years)  on  expected  inflation,  actual 
inflation,  and  Federal  Reserve  policy  to  see  whether  an  increase  in  inflation  expectations  could  be  used 
as  the  basis  of  policy  actions  to  be  taken  in advance  of  accelerating  inflation.  Assume  that  Chairman 
Greenspan’s  policy  would  use  expected  inflation  as a  guide  for  policy;  if  expected  inflation  has  risen 
by  at  least  one  percentage  point  over  the  previous  four  quarters,  Chairman  Greenspan  will  adopt  tight 
policy  (defined,  as  above,  as  an  increase  of  the  discount  rate  by  at  least  one-quarter  of  one  percentage 
point  over  the  following  three  quarters)  on  the  anticipation  that  actual  inflation  will  rise  by  at  least  one 
percentage  point  over  the  next  four  quarters.  We  examined  whether  an  increase  in  inflation 
expectations  had,  in the  past,  correctly  anticipated  future  inflation;  we  next  examined  whether  the 
Federal  Reserve  had  knowingly  or  unknowingly  followed  this  policy  in the  past. 
Table  5  shows  that  between  1978.4  and  1992.3  there  were  7  instances  in which  rising  expectations  of 
inflation  were  followed  by  accelerating  actual  inflation;  there  were  3  instances  in which  rising 
expectations  of  inflation  were  not  followed  by  accelerating  actual  inflation.  There  were  22  observations 
in  which  expected  inflation  was  not  rising,  but  actual  inflation  did  accelerate,  and  24  observations  in 
which  expected  inflation  was  not  rising,  and  actual  inflation  did  not  accelerate.  Overall,  rising  expected 
inflation  is  followed  by  rising  actual  inflation  70  percent  of  the  time.  However,  instances  of 
accelerating  actual  inflation  were  predicted  by  rising  expected  inflation  only  24  percent  of  the  time;  in 
most  cases  expected  inflation  did  not  correctly  anticipate  inflation. 
Table 5 Expected  Inflation  Target 
Actual Inflation  Actual Intlation  Tight Policy  Easy Policy 
Accelerated  Did Not Accelerate  Adopted  Adopted 
Expected  Inflation  7  3  8  2 
Increased 
Expected  Inflation  22  24  I3  25 
Did Not Increase 
Total  29  27  21  27 
Source:  Expected  mtlation  IS measured by Utuversity ot Michtgan’s  Expected I  tl t  n  a ion series, one year  orwar d forecast.  The authors’ wish  to 
acknowledge  the Federal Reserve  Bank of Cleveland  for assistance  with this data. 
It  is possible  that  perverse  policy  generated  the  accelerating  inflation  that  the  expected  inflation  series 
could  not  anticipate.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Federal  Reserve  was  adopting  an  expected  inflation 
guide  over  the  period  analyzed.  In  8 out  of  10 cases  (80  percent)  in which 
predicted  accelerating  inflation,  the  Federal  Reserve  did  adopt  tight  money 
the  expected  inflation  guide 
policy  --  a  “correct”  policy 
28 response.  Interestingly,  of  the  2 cases  in which  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  adopt  tight  policy,  neither 
was  followed  by  accelerating  inflation;  however,  in  7 of  the  8 cases  in  which  the  Federal  Reserve  did 
adopt  tight  policy,  inflation  accelerated.  Of  the  occasions  in which  tight  policy  was  adopted,  13 out  of 
21  (62  percent)  were  not  indicated  by  the  expected  inflation  guide.  Thus,  it  does  not  appear  that  the 
Fed  was  adopting  an  expected  inflation  guide  over  the  period  analyzed.  There  were  22  occasions  on 
which  the  expected  inflation  guide  did  not  indicate  accelerating  inflation  and  actual  inflation 
accelerated  anyway.  Of  these,  the  Federal  Reserve  adopted  easy  money  policy  in  8 out  of  22  (36 
percent);  on  these  occasions,  it could  be  argued  that  the  easy  money  policy  generated  the  inflation. 
However,  in  another  8 cases  (36  percent)  the  Federal  Reserve  adopted  tight  policy  and  inflation 
accelerated  anyway;  in  the  remaining  6 cases  (27  percent)  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  change  policy 
and  inflation  accelerated.  Thus,  in the  majority  of  cases  where  the  expected  inflation  guide  does  not 
predict  the  accelerating  inflation  that  actually  occurs,  the  acceleration  of  inflation  cannot  be  attributed 
to  easy  money  policy. 
An  Alternative  Approach  to Monetary  Policy 
The  period  from  World  War  II  to  the  late  1960s  or  early  1970s  has  frequently  been  called  the  “golden 
age”  of  U.S.  economic  history.  It  is beyond  the  scope  of  this  Public  Policy Bri@to  review  in  detail  all 
the  factors  that  contributed  to  the  superior  economic  performance  over  this  period  (see  Fazzari  1995, 
Galbraith  1995,  Kregel  1995,  Wray  1995).  We  will  focus,  instead,  only  on  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
aggregate  monetary  policy.  The  key  difference  between  the  early  postwar  period  and  the  late  postwar 
period  is the  degree  of  commitment  of  the  Federal  Reserve  to  stable,  and  generally  low,  interest  rates. 
After  World  War  II,  the  Federal  Reserve  was  committed  to  “pegging”  U.S.  government  bond  prices. 
As  a  result,  between  the  first  quarter  of  1946  and  the  first  quarter  of  1948,  the  discount  rate  remained 
at  1 percent;  it then  remained  below  2 percent  until  the  end  of  1955  --  a period  of  ten  years  in  which 
it did  not  fluctuate  by  more  than  one  percentage  point.  In  1951  the  Federal  Reserve  abandoned  the 
interest  rate  peg  with  its  Treasury-Fed  Accord.  Over  time  the  Federal  Reserve  gradually  abrogated  its 
commitment  to  low  and  stable  interest  rates.  Still,  until  1966  the  Federal  Reserve  maintained  the 
discount  rate  below  4  percent  and  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate  well  below  5 percent.  In  1966  the 
Federal  Reserve  (apparently  due  to  fear  of  forthcoming  inflation)  pushed  the  discount  rate  to  4.5 
percent  and  the  Treasury  bill  rate  above  5 percent;  the  first  financial  crisis  of  the  postwar  period 
resulted  (Minsky  1986,  Wolfson  1986).  Aficr  1966  the  Federal  Reserve  embarked  on  a  series  of 
attempts  to  “fine-tune”  the  economy  through  the  use  of  tight  money  policy  each  time  there  was  fear 
that  inflation  would  accelerate.  In  late  1969,  from  1973  to  1974,  from  1978  to  1985,  and  from  1988  to 
29 1990  the  Federal  Reserve  pushed  short-term  rates  higher  and  in each  case  financial  crises  and/or 
recessions  ensued. 
The  transition  to  attempts  at  tine-tuning  has  led  to  much  greater  interest  rate  instability  (see  Table  6). 
From  mid- 1959  to  1966  the  standard  deviation  of  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate  was  0.6 1, while 
that  of  long-term  government  securities  was  only  0.14.  For  the  Treasury  bills,  the  standard  deviation 
increased  to  1.27  for  1966  to  1978  and  to  2.96  for  1978  to  1993;  for  long-term  securities,  the  standard 
deviation  rose  to  0.84  and  1.87  for  these  periods.  Between  1978  and  1993  the  maximum  three-  month 
Treasury  bill  interest  rate  was  over  15 percent.  and  the  minimum  was  less  than  3 percent;  between 
1959  and  1966  the  maximum  was  4.3  percent  and  the  minimum  was  2.32  percent.  This  recent  interest 
rate  instability  has  increased  uncertainty,  increased  the  difficulty  of  writing  forward  money  contracts, 
and  contributed  to  the  growth  of  derivatives  as  economic  agents  tried  to  hedge  interest  rate  risk.  While 
Chairman  Greenspan  refers  to  the  costs  of  uncertainty  generated  by  inflation,  we  believe  the  costs  of 
uncertainty  generated  by  unstable  interest  rates  (and  exchange  rates)  may  be  as  important,  if  not  more 
important.  Indeed,  the  explosion  of  the  derivatives  market,  which  entails  substantial  costs  and  risks,  is 
evidence  that  markets  believe  interest  rate  instability  is costly. 
Table  6  Volatile  Interest  Rates 
Period  Interest  Rate  Mean 




7.25  2.61  14.00  3.00 
1959.2-1993.3  Three-month 
Treasury  bills 




1959.2-l  965.4  Three-month 
Treasury  bills 




1966.1-1977.4  Three-month 
Treasury  bills 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum  Minimum 
6.18  2.80  15.09  2.32 
4.04  0.14  4.35  3.80 
3.18 
I 
0.61  4.30  2.32 
6.08  0.84  7.27  4.44 
5.59 
I 
1.27  8.39  3.43 




9.5 I  1.87  13.60  6.15 
1978.1-1993.3  Three-month  7.91  2.96  15.09  2.98 
Treasury  bills 
Sources:  The Forecastmg  Center  o  The  Jerome  Levy  Economrcs  Instrtute;  National  Income  and 
Product  Account. 
We want to  emphasize  again  our belief  that active  Federal Reserve  policy  is sometimes  warranted;  we 
agree  that  the Federal  Reserve  must  retain  some  discretionary  power  to take  aggressive  action  when 
such  action  becomes  necessary.  However,  the  escalation  of  its intervention  into the  economy  that  has 
occurred  under  the  leadership  of chairmen  Volcker  and Greenspan  has raised  uncertainty,  increased 
instability  in domestic  financial  markets,  contributed  to  instability  of the  dollar  in foreign  exchange 
markets  (a topic  beyond  the  scope  of this Public  Policy Brief), generated  costs  of hedging  and 
increased  interest  rate and  default  risk, and had deleterious  consequences  for economic  growth.  A 
comparison  of the  results  of Federal  Reserve  policy  before  1966 and after  1966 suggests  that  policy 
directed  at stabilizing  interest  rates  more  successmlly  accomplishes  the goals  outlined  in the  1946 
Employment  Act and  the  1978 Full  Employment  and Balanced  Growth  Act. The  period  before  1966 
witnessed  lower unemployment  and  lower inflation  than the period  after  1966 when  the  Fed  increased 
its intervention. 
Previous  to  Chairman  Volcker’s  experiment  in practical  monetarism,  the Federal  Reserve  employed 
tight  money  policy  to  fight  perceived  inflationary  pressures  usually  in response  to  expansionary  fiscal 
policy.  For  example,  the  Federal  Reserve’s  move  to tight  policy  in  1966 was in the  context  of a high 
employment  economy  with  rising  government  defense  expenditures  during  the  Vietnam  War. Although 
the Federal  Reserve’s  movement  to tight  policy  in  1979 occurred  during  high  unemployment,  the  tight 
policy  during  the  early  1980s was frequently  justified  as necessary  to reduce  inflationary  pressures 
thought  to result  from  the  large and  rising  government  deficits  during  President  Reagan’s  terms. 
However,  the  recent  tightening  of monetary  policy  under  Chairman  Greenspan  has occurred  while 
government  deficits  have  been  falling  and after the  president  and  Congress  reached  agreements  that 
will  substantially  reduce  fiscal stimulus.  Thus,  unlike  previous  periods  in which  tight  money  policy 
could  be justified  on the basis that  fiscal policy  was excessively  stimulative.  the  current  tightening 
comes  while  fiscal  policy  is widely  believed  to be moving  to  reduce  the  stimulus.  Indeed,  many 
economists  have  argued  that the  fiscal  stance  is even  recessionary;  many  have  called  on President 
31 Clinton  to  increase  public  infrastructure  spending.  largely  due  to  the  fiscal  stimulus  it  would  provide. 
The  evidence  also  suggests  that  Chairman  Greenspan’s  proposed  targets  (whether  real  interest  rates  or 
expected  inflation)  would  have  led  to  incorrect  policy  much  of  the  time  in the  past,  and  there  is no 
reason  to  expect  these  will  perform  any  better  in the  future.  By  Chairman  Greenspan’s  own 
admission”,  (1)  our  understanding  of  the  economy  is imperfect  and  the  measurement  of  important 
variables  like  inflation  is  imprecise,  (2)  no  variables  (other  than  expected  inflation,  which  the  chairman 
admits  is  difficult  to  measure  and  which  our  tests  have  rejected  as  unreliable)  are  sufficiently  well 
correlated  with  inflation  to  allow  their  use  in policy  formation,  (3)  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on 
the  economy  is subject  to  long,  uncertain,  and  variable  lags,  (4)  economic  theory  does  not  provide 
unambiguous  guidance  for  the  formation  of  monetary  policy,  and  (5)  there  is no  consensus  regarding 
how  the  Federal  Reserve  can  stabilize  prices  even  if,  as  Chairman  Greenspan  claims,  there  is growing 
consensus  that  central  bank  policy  should  stabilize  prices.  We,  however,  do  not  agree  that  this  should 
be  the  sole  goal  of  monetary  policy,  nor  does  Congress,  which  has  twice  directed  the  Federal  Reserve 
also  to  pursue  full  employment  (setting  an  unemployment  rate  of  3 percent  as  the  target,  defined  as 
full  employment). 
The  Fed  has  moved  to  tighten  policy  this  year  while  citing  a  variety  of  arguments  to justify  its  actions. 
However,  recent  statements  have  suggested  that  Fed  policy  is based  on  hunches  rather  than  on  any 
specific  indicators.  According  to  Governor  LaWare,  “1 get  a  feel  for  what  I think  is going  on  based  on 
the  information  --  not  only  the  anecdotal  information  in the  press  and  the  statistical  information 
assembled  and  compiled  by  the  staff  here.  but  also  from  the  general  tone  of  the  markets.  I’m  probably 
least  sensitive  to  the  money  figures  because  I don’t  know  what  they  mean  anymore”  (Bradsher  1994). 
Noted  monetarist  Jordan  admits  “In the  last  30  years,  economists  have  uncovered  little  additional 
information  about  how  monetary  policy  works,  except  for  the  finding  that  expectations  of  future  policy 
are  vitally  important  in the  process”  (Jordan  1993).  David  Jones,  a  longtime  Fed  watcher  says  that 
“policy  has  become  more  intuitive  over  the  last  year”  (Bradsher  1994).  Bradsher  reports  that  “Fed 
officials  in  effect  rely  on  educated  hunches  of  what  they  should  do,  rather  than  following  the  dictates 
of  computer  models  or  a couple  of  key  indicators”  (Bradsher  1994).  And,  finally.  Governor  Lindsey’s 
statement  summarizes  the  problem  faced  by  the  Federal  Reserve:  “I came  on  believing  what  I had  been 
taught  --  and  taught  as  a  professor  --  which  was  M2.  1 don’t  think  I can  use  it anymore.  [Instead]  we 
look  at  a  whole  raft  of  variables  --  we  ignore  nothing  and_/bcus  on  nothing”  (Bradsher  1994,  emphasis 
added). 
32 The  Federal  Reserve’s  stance  from  mid-1992  to  February  1994  was  the  correct  policy:  by  holding  the 
discount  rate  at  3 percent,  the  Federal  Reserve  allowed  short-term  rates  to  fall  quickly,  and  long-term 
rates  were  gradually  declining.  The  economy  began  to  recover  from  a  prolonged  recession;  firms  and 
households  were  able  to  refinance  at  lower  interest  rates,  reducing  debt  loads  and  allowing  them  to 
undertake  new  spending;  unemployment  fell;  the  government  interest  burden  declined  and  the  federal 
budget  deficit  was  reduced;  financial  institutions  and  markets  recovered;  and  the  dollar  held  steady  in 
foreign  exchange  markets  (although  it fell  against  the  yen,  which  is exactly  what  it  should  have  done 
given  the  large  U.S.  trade  deficit  with  Japan).  The  experience  since  February  1994  stands  in  stark 
contrast  to  the  relative  tranquility  of  that  period.  The  tighter  monetary  policy  was  a mistake,  and  it 
would  be  an  even  greater  mistake  to  tighten  further. 
Conclusion 
The  experiment  of  targeting  monetary  aggregates  was  a  failure.  Chairman  Greenspan  has  proposed 
replacing  monetary  aggregates  with  either  real  interest  rate  or  expected  inflation  targets.  This  Public 
Policy  Bri@“has  cast  some  doubt  on  Chairman  Greenspan’s  choice  of  a  real  interest  rate  target  for 
monetary  policy.  We  have  also  argued  that  had  the  Chairman  adopted  such  a  target  in the  past,  this 
would  not  have  helped  to  stabilize  the  economy.  We  also  cast  doubt  on  the  use  of  expected  inflation 
data  series  as  the  basis  of  policy  formulation.  Chairman  Greenspan  has  argued  that  current  conditions 
indicate  inflation  will  soon  accelerate,  imposing  intolerable  costs  on  society.  It  is apparent  that  the  only 
justification  for  frequent  changes  of  policy  is to  a great  extent  the  Federal  Reserve’s  intuition  regarding 
what  will  lower  inflation  expectations  and  the  Federal  Reserve’s  hypothesis  that  lower  inflation 
expectations  are  necessary  to  prevent  a  future  acceleration  of  inflation.  We  see  little  evidence  that 
inflation  is  likely  to  accelerate:  manufacturing  globally  is operating  far  below  capacity;  real  wages  are 
falling  in  the  United  States  and  in other  developed  economies;  labor  productivity  has  risen  rapidly  in 
the  United  States;  many  eastern  European  countries  are  set  to  increase  exports;  unemployment  rates  are 
high  among  most  member  nations  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD);  and  low-wage,  high-unemployment  countries  in the  developing  world  can  increase  exports  to 
meet  any  rise  of  world  demand.  And  we do not agree that the moderate  inflation  achieved  recently 
entails  significant  costs. Indeed,  the benefits  to be gained  by eliminating  this inflation  cannot  be 
expected  to exceed  the costs  that would  be engendered  by higher unemployment,  greater  uncertainty, 
and  lost output.  Until  economists  obtain  a  clearer  estimate  of  the  costs  of  inflation,  of  policies  that  can 
be  used  successfully  to  fight  inflation,  and  of  the  costs  of  fighting  inflation.  pursuit  of  zero  inflation  as 
the  ultimate  goal  of  monetary  policy  must  be  seen  as  an  insupportable,  risky,  and  excessively  radical 
33 proposition. 
What  is most  apparent  from  recent  policy  statements  is that  the  Federal  Reserve’s  policy  has  become 
increasingly  rudderless.  The  Federal  Reserve  appears  to  be  “flying  blind,”  choosing  target  variables 
that  reflect  “hunches”  that  inflation  will  rise.  The  result  is a  series  of  destabilizing  policy  changes  that 
disrupt  financial  markets  and  have  negative  impacts  on  the  “real”  sector  (that  is,  on  employment  and 
investment  decisions).  Rather  than  watching  inflation  or  other  economic  variables,  Wall  Street  is 
watching  the  Federal  Reserve  trying  to  guess  what  the  Fed  might  do  next.  Even  the  noted  monetarist 
William  Poole  argues,  “It’s  a  very  dangerous  game  to  play,  to  drag  out  whatever  indicator  is pointing 
in the  right  direction”  (Bradsher  1994). 
We  believe  inflation  has  been,  is,  and  is likely  to  be  well  within  acceptable  limits.  Federal  Reserve 
policy  should  be  refocused  on  providing  a stable  financial  sector  (through  lender  of  last  resort  policy 
and  maintenance  of  low  interest  rates).  This  will  help  to  provide  an  environment  in which  employment 
can  rise.  Given  the  current  state  of  the  economy,  it  is far  more  important  to  focus  on  full  employment 
than  on  inflation. 
Thus,  we  call  on  the  Federal  Reserve  to  hold  U.S.  interest  rates  steady  and  to  work  with  other  central 
banks  to  move  toward  an  accommodative  stance  that  would  allow  interest  rates  to  fall  worldwide.  This 
will  help  to  generate  a  worldwide  recovery.  Should  a  concerted  effort  by  central  banks  to  stimulate 
recovery  around  the  world  eventually  lead  to  excessively  high  economic  growth,  then  at  that  time  a 
consensus  may  develop  that  central  banks  should  (in  conjunction  with  fiscal  policy)  move  toward  a 
tighter  stance  to  reduce  inflationary  pressures.  With  an  estimated  35  million  people  unemployed  in 
OECD  countries  --  a total  that  rivals  the  worst  years  of  the  Great  Depression  --  we  are  far  from  that 
position  today. 
34 Endnotes 
1. We would  like to thank  Steven  M. Fazzari,  J. Peter  Ferderer,  Wynne  Godley,  Peter Gray,  Tom  Karier,  Jan 
Kregel,  David  A. Levy,  S Jay  Levy,  Anthony  Laramie,  and Robert  Pollin  for comments  on earlier  drafts  of this 
paper. 
2. In the first  four years  of  Alan Greenspan’s  tenure  there  were a total of 20 dissenting  votes  cast  at FOMC 
meetings  for tighter  money  policy,  of which  18 came  from Federal  Reserve  district  bank  presidents;  of  23 
dissenting  votes  cast for  easier  money  policy,  only  2 came  from Federal  Reserve  district  bank  presidents  (Murray 
1991). 
3. At that time  Chairman  Greenspan  presented  testimony  that was published  in an Executive  Summary 
(Greenspan  1994a). 
4. Over  the period  from  1979.1 to  1993.3 we calculate  that the correlation  of  inflation  (as measured  by changes 
of the CPI)  with contemporaneous  and lagged  values  of the median one-year-ahead  intlation  expectations 
decreases  steadily  with the length of the lag, from  0.89 for contemporaneous  inflation  expectations  to 0.87  for  a 
one-quarter  lag, to 0.83 for  a two-quarter  lag, to 0.82 for a three-quarter  lag, and to 0.73 for a four-quarter  lag. 
Similarly,  in simple  OLS  regressions  of  inflation  on expected  inflation,  correlation  coefficients  and T-statistics 
decrease  steadily  as the length  of lag on expected  inflation  increases.  In regressions  that include  a constant  and 
one expected  inflation  variable,  the values  for  R-squared  and T-statistics  (in parentheses)  are: contemporaneous, 
R-squared  = 0.80  (15.1);  one-quarter  lag, R-squared  = 0.75 (13.1); two-quarter  lag, R-squared  = 0.70  (11.5); 
three-quarter  lag, R-squared  = 0.67 (10.7);  four-quarter  lag, R-squared  = 0.53 (8.0).  (Durbin-Watson  statistics 
decrease  steadily  from  1.93 to  1.04 in these  regressions,  indicating  that positive  serial correlation  is a problem  as 
the  lag increases  so that reported  standard errors  are probably  too small -- and R-squared  too  high -- in the 
regressions  with greater  lags.) 
5. Chairman  Greenspan’s  testimony  of  August  10, 1994 (Greenspan  1994~)  reaffirmed  the difficulties  in 
forecasting  the performance  of the U.S. economy  given the imprecise  measurement  of official  statistics  such  as 
the CPI and other  price  indexes  that often  tend to overstate  inflation. 
35 Figure  1 Inflation,  Ml,  and  M2  growth.  The  figure  represents  the  inflation 
rate  as  measured  by  quarterly  changes  in  the  consumer  price  index  and  quar- 
terly  changes  in Ml  andM2. 
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Source:  Nationnl  Income and  Product  Account  and  the  Forecastmg  Center  of The  Jerome 
Levy  Economics  Insrltuce. 
Figure  2  Actual  and  Expected  Inflation  Growth.  The  figure  represents  the 
inflation  rate  as  measured  by  quarterly  changes  in  the  consumer  price  index 
and  expected  inflation  as  measured  by  the  University  of  Michigan’s  expected 
inflation  series  one  year  forward  forecast. 
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